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Letter from the Editors 
The Gettysburg Historical Journal embodies the History 
Department's dedication to diverse learning and excellence in 
academics. Each year, the Journal publishes the top student work 
in a range of topics across the spectrum of academic disciplines 
with different methodological approaches to the study of history. 
In the words of Marc Bloch, author of The Historian's Craft, 
"history is neither watchmaking nor cabinet construction. It is an 
endeavor toward better understanding." In the spirit of this maxim, 
our authors strive to elucidate the many facets of human societies 
and cultures. Whether this research is focused on politics, religion, 
economics, environmental history, or women, gender, and 
sexuality studies, the editorial staff is consistently proud of the 
diverse subject matter we select for publication. 
With the assistance of the Cupola, Gettysburg College's 
online research repository, and the distinguished college faculty, 
our authors' work has received both serious scholarly attention and 
national accolades. Past authors have gone on to publish follow-up 
work in refereed journals, and to present their work at 
undergraduate and professional conferences. The Gettysburg 
Historical Journal is primarily a student-run organization, and as 
such, it provides undergraduate students with a unique opportunity 
to gain valuable experience reviewing, editing, and organizing 
academic articles for publication. In all cases, authors and editors 
have also had the opportunity to apply these skills to their future 
careers, or to their work as graduate students. 
This sixteenth edition of the Gettysburg Historical Journal 
continues the tradition of scholarly rigor of past volumes, while 
broadening both the diversity of historical perspectives and the 
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methodologies employed by each author. Each of the following 
works selected for this edition exemplifies the varied interests of 
the History students at Gettysburg College. 
In his article, "The Nazi Fiscal Cliff: Unsustainable 
Financial Practices before World War II," Parker Abt analyzes the 
powerful but ultimately unsustainable methods used by the Nazi 
government to transform the weak German economy they inherited 
from the Great Depression. 
Abigail M. Currier's article, "A Different Way of Touring 
Europe: One Aid Man's Journey Across Europe During World War 
II," examines the memoirs of Robert Bell Bradley in order to 
highlight the experiences of one American veteran of World War II 
who participated in the D-Day Invasion of Normandy and was later 
taken captive by German troops. 
Matthew D. LaRoche discusses divisions within the 
African American community that arose in response to the media’s 
portrayal of black soldiers at home during and after World War I, 
and the country’s inability to respect the liberties of the soldiers in 
his article "From Crusaders to Flunkies: American Newspaper 
Coverage of Black First World War Soldiers from 1915 and 1930."  
In his article, "Helpers in a "Heathen" Land?: An 
Examination of Missionary Perceptions of the Cherokees," 
Andrew C. Nosti deconstructs traditional views on the relationship 
between missionaries and Cherokees in order to reveal a far more 
complex interracial and intercultural dynamic in the Early 
Republic of the United States. 
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Kaylyn L. Sawyer’s article, “A Divided Front: Military 
Dissent During the Vietnam War,” examines the ideological 
disunity among soldiers during the Vietnam War. She traces these 
divisions to a changing culture within the United States in the 
years and decades after World War II, as well as revelations about 
the government’s dishonesty about the nature of the war. 
This edition of the Gettysburg Historical Journal also 
includes an article featuring responses given by four professors 
within the History Department at Gettysburg College given in 
answer to the following question: What figure, event, or idea 
inspires your interest in history? 
Collectively, these articles demonstrate the hard work and careful 
research of our student authors, and exemplify the diverse interests 
of our students and faculty in the study of history. 
The General Editors, 
Caitlin T. Connelly 
Julia K. Deros 
Brianna O’Boyle 
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Featured Piece  
 
This year the General Editors decided to create a feature 
piece to show our appreciation for the History Department. We 
selected four professors from the faculty to answer a question 
about history: what figure/event/idea inspires your interest in 
history? Reading their responses helped give us insight into the 
thoughts of these brilliant minds and further help us understand 
their passion for the subject we all share a common love and 
interest in. We hope that you enjoy reading their responses as 
much as we did.  
 
Dr. Timothy Shannon 
 
Dr. Timothy Shannon teaches Early American, Native American, and 
British history. He received his BA from Brown University and his PhD from 
Northwestern University. His book Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of 
Empire: The Albany Congress of 1754 (Cornell, 2000) won the Dixon Ryan Fox 
Prize from the New York State Historical Association and the Distinguished 
Book Award from the Society of Colonial Wars. 
I first became interested in early American history as a 
child. I grew up in a suburban Connecticut town that had a green 
and a couple of Congregational churches at its center. One of those 
churches had a cemetery that dated back to the mid-eighteenth 
century, and in my comings and goings, I always enjoyed pausing 
to read the names and epitaphs that were still legible on those 
weathered gravestones. They told me about people who had 
walked in my steps two centuries before, long before paved roads, 
automobiles, and bicycles, and that sense of time gone by gave me 
an appreciation for where I was from, even if my town looked like 
all the other towns around it. 
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Later on, as a high school and college student, I was drawn 
to the study of history because it was a subject I seemed to do well 
in without much effort, as opposed to math and other quantitative 
disciplines. I did not read much historical fiction, but I liked 
biography and other genres of non-fiction, even the scholarly 
books I was assigned in my college history courses. As impending 
adulthood forced me to think about ways to make a living, I 
considered law school, a common path for many history majors, 
but was also drawn to teaching. When I thought about the kind of 
life I wanted to have, my college professors struck me as a useful 
model. They certainly weren’t rich, but neither did they appear to 
be starving, and they all seemed to enjoy their work. Of course, I 
had very little idea of what they actually did when they were not in 
the classroom (committee work is something best hidden from the 
young and innocent), but I was impressed by the fact that they 
wrote books and articles in addition to teaching their classes. The 
idea of writing history appealed to my creative side, and it still 
does. I have never exhibited much interest in the visual arts and my 
enthusiasm for making music far outpaces my ability to do so, but 
historical research and writing perfectly balance my aspirations 
with my abilities, and so here I am. 
 
Dr. Ian Isherwood 
 
Dr. Ian Isherwood specializes in modern history with a focus on the 
history of war and memory studies. He has taught in both the English and 
History Departments at Gettysburg College and serves as the academic 
coordinator for the Civil War Era Studies minor. He is a Gettysburg College 
alumni having received his BA here, he received his MA from Dartmouth 
College and his PhD from University of Glasgow. He is the author 
of Remembering the Great War (IB Tauris, 2017) and his articles and book 
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reviews have appeared in First World War Studies, War, Literature and the 
Arts, The Journal of Military History, and War in History.  
I am going to take something of a dodge on the question of 
what figure/event inspires me from history. With the limitations of 
space here, not to mention the attention spans of readers, any 
attempt for me to define and discuss either the many historical 
figures that I find inspirational or the many events that I find 
moving, might seem flippant. So, I am going to withdraw my 
forces in an orderly way, reestablish a line of defense, and attempt 
to outflank the question. 
I am often intrigued by the fact that so many of my students 
wince when I say the word ‘historiography’. The word itself is 
neutral – it has no inherent negative and certainly no positive 
connotations – but it is a word that is immediately associated with 
rigor, boredom, and an undue amount of stress. Yet, this word, or 
shall I say what it means – process – is what I find most 
inspirational in being an historian. Facts, figures, and events are 
the moving parts of history, but they require a researcher and a 
writer – a working and curious mind - to actually make sense of 
their meaning. It is that role in which the historian has the honor of 
playing. 
The play itself has three acts: Act 1 (Setting: The Dorm 
Room/The Graduate Suite/The Faculty Office) the struggle with 
one’s topic, to create an inference/idea, to gather and read one’s 
secondary sources; Act 2 (Setting: The Archive) working with 
piles of documents and uncovering new ways of thinking about the 
subject based on a new reading of the documents; Act 3 (Setting: 
The Computer Screen) he struggle to write with sense, clarity, and 
purpose – crafting and layering one’s work through revision. (Note 
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to self: dramaturgical analogy is not the best way to make this 
point). 
So why do I find so much enjoyment in the process of 
interpretation and writing? I think it is because somewhere 
between my eighteenth and twentieth birthdays, I grew fatigued by 
the Gradgrind approach to history – rote memorization and all the 
‘well actually-ing’ that can come in our discipline. It seemed like 
this – trying to own the past by hoarding minutia - was missing the 
forest for the trees. Thankfully, I was taking methods at the time 
and through that and my senior seminar later on Eisenhower (and 
really all my history classes at GC), I grew to appreciate the ways 
in which historians interpreted and argued and I was able to get my 
hands dirty with documents. I learned that history was malleable 
and imperfect, which I found liberating. 
Later, in graduate school – surrounded by brilliant 
professors and peers – I learned over and over again the value of 
humility and the limitations of my own knowledge. As professor, I 
have learned just how difficult it is to convey complex ideas and 
differing approaches with clarity to students who oftentimes want 
answers (and not more questions). At every level of my historical 
training, what has driven my interest is not just the people and 
events of the past, but how to interpret these things to make them 
seem relevant. This – the making of history from imperfect sources 
– is what I find to be the most inspirational part of our art for it 
poses a daily challenge to the way we see the past in our present. 
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Dr. Jill Titus 
 
Dr. Jill Titus’s work focuses on 20th-century African American history, 
civil rights and public history. She is particularly interested in the intersection of 
African American history and public memory. She received her BA from Taylor 
University and both her MA and PhD from University of Massachusetts. Her 
first book, Brown’s Battleground: Students, Segregationists, and the Struggle 
for Justice in Prince Edward County, Virginia (UNC Press, 2011), was a finalist 
for the Library of Virginia Literary Award. 
  
As is probably true for most people, my answer to this 
question is continually in flux. As a child, my interest in history 
was kindled by visits to Colonial Williamsburg and Gettysburg, 
and countless hours lost in the orange-bound pages of the 
Childhood of Famous Americans series, both of which resonated 
with me deeply, albeit in different ways. Ultimately, though, I 
think the takeaway for me was that history was made up of stories, 
lived by people whose lives were very different from my own, but 
who sometimes felt some of the same emotions that I did. I wanted 
to understand these people, and “see” the world they saw.  
As I got older, stories continued to resonate with me, but I 
became more and more interested in the relationship between 
historical “events” and lived experience, and in the way the same 
event could be experienced differently by different people. I 
became fascinated by the idea of perspective – and I clearly 
remember the way it began. Having loved Johnny Tremain, I was 
thrilled to find a book called Redcoat in Boston in my school 
library. The main character was the same age as Johnny Tremain, 
and both books dealt with the same events, but Redcoat in 
Boston encouraged readers to empathize not with the Sons of 
Liberty, but with the British soldiers. I was astounded at how 
differently the familiar story of pre-Revolutionary tension in 
~ 16 ~ 
 
Boston came across when approached from a different 
perspective.  
Books have always played a really important role in 
shaping my historical interests, so the figures and events that 
inspire me have shifted based on what I’m reading. In and after 
college, I read a lot of Civil War and colonial American history, 
which I combined with stints at Gettysburg NMP and 
Independence NHP. By the time I began my graduate work in 
history, I was fascinated by the relationship between religion and 
politics in the founding era. But not long after that, my interest in 
modern civil rights history, kickstarted by an unforgettable class in 
college, reignited, and for the past 15 years, has supplied the fuel 
for my interest in history. It all fascinates me – the tactics, the 
personalities, the multiple fronts, the shifting alliances, and most of 
all, the unyielding determination to challenge injustice. I care 
deeply about this field, in no small part, because it connects so 
profoundly with the present. 
 
Dr. Scott Hancock 
 
Dr. Scott Hancock’s interest focuses on the African American 
experience from the mid-seventeenth century to just before the Civil War. His 
work considers African Americans’ engagement with the law, and incorporates 
other disciplinary perspectives such as law & society and geography. He 
received his BA from Bryan College and both his MA and PhD from University 
of New Hampshire. Some of his work has appeared in the anthologies Paths to 
Freedom, We Shall Independent Be, and Slavery, Resistance, Freedom, and 
more recently in the journal Civil War History. 
 
In 1975, when I was 13 years old and living in Heidelberg, 
West Germany, when comic books were 25¢—when kid math was 
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still easy, four for a buck—and when the Amazing Spiderman was 
still Amazing, I collected comic books avidly (that’s right, we 
called them books, not magazines.) That spring my mother, my 
brother and I rode a train into West Berlin—my father, an Army 
intelligence officer, wasn’t permitted into East Germany because, 
as he claimed, his brain was a weapon that knew too much. Soon 
after we arrived, we took a bus to East Berlin, through the Berlin 
wall at Checkpoint Charlie. East German guards inspected our 
stuff…and took what seemed to me a sinister interest in my 
Spiderman comics. What I remember is that they confiscated them. 
It is entirely possible this is a memory colored by what came after; 
maybe they simply examined and returned them. Regardless, the 
question it generated was why? Why are they like this? 
What came after seemed a stark contrast to sections of 
West Berlin we had seen, which were vibrant, westernized, shiny 
and modern. East Berlin was drab, run down, almost stifling. The 
few people we saw with seemed (to a 13 year-old American army 
brat) at best indifferent and at worst depressed. That it was a grey 
overcast day didn’t help. For me, the why question stuck: what had 
happened to produce what appeared to be two such starkly 
different worlds, side-by-side? 
That day alone didn’t spark my interest in history. I already 
had intense interest in World War II, especially aerial warfare. And 
though I was mixed race, I never identified as white, and started 
developing interest in stories of Black pride and power. But 
looking back, the experiences of moving from a working-class, 
racist white neighborhood in Baltimore to a military community in 
West Germany during the Cold War, of growing up with an 
outspoken Black woman (my mother), of seeing the effects of anti-
American terrorist groups targeting American military 
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installations, of being the child of white man who served three 
tours in Vietnam…that one day of moving through the Berlin wall 
may have coalesced a variety of questions into two: why do people 
do the things they do? And what might get them to do things 
differently? 
Answering those questions requires a sankofa experience: 
understanding what came before in order to effectively move 
forward. 
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The Nazi Fiscal Cliff: Unsustainable 
Financial Practices before World War II  
By  
Parker Abt 
~ ♦ ~ 
 
The Great Depression hit Germany harder than it did any 
other European country.1 With a fragile economy that was 
financed primarily by foreign short term loans, the country endured 
a banking crisis when the 1929 stock market crash caused these 
loans to be called back. The crisis reached its trough at the close of 
1931 when Herbert Hoover had to allow Germany a one year 
reparations holiday to avoid a total economic collapse. Three 
successive governments failed to stimulate employment before the 
Nazis came to power in January 1933.2 The ensuing miraculous 
growth of the German economy, the quickest in history, causes one 
to ask how the government financed the recovery. 3 This paper 
attempts to document the Nazis’ financing methods, both on a 
domestic and global scale. It argues that these methods were 
unsustainable, leading to economic uncertainty by the time war 
broke out in 1939. 
Upon taking power, the Nazis immediately implemented an 
expansionary fiscal policy that encouraged job growth through 
                                                          
1 Albrecht Ritschl, “Deficit Spending in the Nazi Recovery, 1933–1938: A 
Critical Reassessment,” Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 
16, no. 4 (December 2002): 561. 
2 Hans-Erich Volkmann, “The National Socialist Economy in Preparation for 
War,” in Germany and the Second World War, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990), 161–63. 
3 Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi 
Economy (New York: Penguin, 2006), xxv. 
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civil building projects and the rearmament of the German 
military.4 Over 140,126 jobs were created in July 1933 as opposed 
to 23,665 in January 1933. By November the average monthly 
growth in jobs had reached 400,000.5 This extremely positive 
growth trend continued to 1936, at which time the economy 
reached full employment.6 The Gross National Product (GNP) 
increased 9% annually while state demand as a share of GNP 
increased from 14% to 31% between 1933 and 1938.7 The Nazis 
paradoxically managed to keep inflation and deficit spending low 
during this remarkable feat of government sponsored recovery.8 
Though these statistics suggest a command economy had taken 
hold, the Nazis actually undertook a campaign of privatizing 
businesses.9 The resulting set of circumstances led one 21st century 
economist to remark  
 
                                                          
4 Raymond L Cohn, “Fiscal Policy in Germany During the Great Depression,” 
Explorations in Economic History 29, no. 3 (July 1, 1992): 338; Rainer 
Fremdling and Reiner Stäglin, “Work Creation and Rearmament in Germany 
1933-1938: A Revisionist Assessment of NS-Economic Policy Based on Input-
Output Analysis” (Discussion Papers, Deutsches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung, 2015), 1. 
5 R. J. Overy, The Nazi Economic Recovery, 1932-1938 (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1982), 53. 
6 Cohn, “Fiscal Policy in Germany During the Great Depression,” 319. 
7 Guido Giacomo Preparata, “Money for the Third Reich: The Nazis’ Financial 
Legerdemain, 1933-1938” (Ph.D., University of Southern California, 1998), 7; 
Christoph Buchheim and Jonas Scherner, “The Role of Private Property in the 
Nazi Economy: The Case of Industry,” The Journal of Economic History 66, no. 
2 (June 2006): 390. 
8 Burton H. Klein, Germany’s Economic Preparations for War (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1959), 32. 
9 Germà Bel, “Against the Mainstream: Nazi Privatization in 1930s Germany,” 
The Economic History Review 63, no. 1 (February 1, 2010): 35–37. Command 
economies exist when the central government plans the nation’s major economic 
ventures. A key characteristic of command economies is government ownership 
of the state’s largest companies. 
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We conclude that the Nazi recovery was not a 
textbook exercise in Keynesian demand 
stimulation… Economic recovery in Germany in 
the 1930s remains the paradox case of public 
demand expansion without Keynesian demand 
creation.10 
 
The catalyst for such an atypical recovery was a sustained 
government campaign to grow the military. Full scale rearmament 
had begun by 1934,  and 70% of government expenditures had 
gone toward it by 1939.11 However, the Nazis felt it necessary to 
completely hide such spending from official figures until March 
1935 since rearmament was illegal per the Treaty of Versailles.12 
There was the added concern of causing inflation. It was clear that 
early in the Nazis’ reign Hitler did not want to induce inflation, 
which would scare Germans, who had vivid memories of the 1923 
hyperinflation.13 He was even willing to harm Germany’s fragile 
foreign trade position to inhibit inflation.14 
                                                          
10 Ritschl, “Deficit Spending in the Nazi Recovery, 1933–1938,” 577. 
11 Ibid.; Fremdling and Stäglin, “Work Creation and Rearmament in Germany 
1933-1938,” 23; David Sanz Bas, “An Austrian Analysis of the Nazi Economic 
Recovery (1933-1939),” Procesos de Mercado 8, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 294. 
12 Hjalmar Schacht, “Unsigned Schacht Memorandum to Hitler Concerning the 
Financing of the Armament Program,” May 3, 1935, 2, 1168-PS, In Nazi 
Conspiracy and Aggression. United States Government Printing Office, 1946. 
The Nazis no longer needed to hide military spending figures because, in March 
of 1935, Hitler announced Germany’s rearmament plans to the world, officially 
breaking one of the world’s worst kept secrets. 
13 Harold James, “Schacht’s Attempted Defection from Hitler’s Germany,” The 
Historical Journal 30, no. 3 (1987): 729; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 76; 
Martin Wolfe, “The Development of Nazi Monetary Policy,” The Journal of 
Economic History 15, no. 4 (December 1, 1955): 392. 
14 “Affidavit I of Emil Puhl,” November 7, 1945, 3, EC-437, In Nazi Conspiracy 
and Aggression. United States Government Printing Office, 1946.; Klein, 
Germany’s Economic Preparations for War, 5. 
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Hitler essentially wanted all the positives of heavy 
government spending without the negatives. In response, the 
architect of the recovery, Reichsbank President Hjalmar Schacht, 
created MeFo bills. At their simplest, MeFo bills were bills of 
exchange.15 They were issued by the industrial company 
Metallurgische ForschungsAnstalt (Metallurgical Research 
Institution). But this company was a dummy corporation, cobbled 
together by Schacht and German heads of industry with a 
capitalization of only 250,000 Reichsmarks (RM).16 The MeFo 
corporation would fund rearmament projects by issuing these bills 
of exchange, which contractors could discount for RMs at private 
banks. These banks were willing to hold MeFo bills because the 
Reichsbank, Germany’s central bank, guaranteed to re-discount 
them. To further entice investors, MeFo bills carried an interest 
rate of 4%, which was higher than that of other trade bills at the 
time. To make sure that the bills were never exchanged for RMs, 
which would lead to inflation, the ninety-day maturation period for 
the bills kept being extended until the actual maturation period 
became five years.17 Summing up how unethical MeFo bills were, 
the Russian Nuremburg judge Iona Nikitchenko called them “a 
swindling venture on a national scale that has no precedent.”18 
From 1934 to 1938, the Nazis funded rearmament through 
12 billion RMs worth of MeFo bills.19 These MeFo bills allowed 
the government to exclude this figure from their official 
                                                          
15 For an exhaustive account of the MeFo bills system, see Preparata, “The 
Nazis’ Financial Legerdemain,” 9–94. 
16 Guido Giacomo Preparata, “Hitler’s Money: The Bills of Exchange of 
Schacht and Rearmament in the Third Reich,” American Review of Political 
Economy 1, no. 1 (December 1, 2002): 21. 
17 Christopher Kopper, “Banking in National Socialist Germany, 1933–39,” 
Financial History Review 5, no. 1 (April 1998): 59. 
18 International Military Tribunal, Opinion and Judgement, 169. 
19 Kopper, “Banking in National Socialist Germany, 1933–39,” 59. 
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expenditure statements (so no inflation could occur) and to 
circumvent the Central Banking Law, which prohibited the 
Reichsbank from funding the government.20 Perhaps most 
importantly, the MeFo bills also allowed the government to hide its 
rearmament financing from the world until Hitler was ready to 
reveal it in March 1935.21 The Nazis knew that dealing in MeFo 
bills was a risky maneuver with the potential for immediate 
collapse and Reichsbank officials hoped that the budget would 
balance before banks decided to rediscount their MeFo bills.22  
After issuing MeFo bills, the Nazis further financed the 
recovery by controlling capital markets, which enabled them to co-
opt private businesses into funding the rearmament and other 
desirable, autarkical programs. Instead of nationalizing 
corporations as the Soviets did, the Nazis provided strong 
incentives for businesses to invest in Reich friendly programs.23 
For example, the Loan Fund Law of December 1934 capped 
dividend payments at 6% of reserves and taxed the surplus.24 
Whereas the retained earnings of private companies had been 170 
million RM in 1933, earnings increased to 3,420 million RM by 
1938. Of those reserves, over 62% were reinvested into the 
economy.25 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 
21 Schacht, “Unsigned Memorandum from Schacht to Hitler,” 2; Hjalmar 
Schacht, “Correspondence between Schacht and Hitler,” January 11, 1939, EC-
369, In Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. United States Government Printing 
Office, 1946. 
22 “Affidavit II of Emil Puhl,” November 8, 1945, 2, EC-438, In Nazi 
Conspiracy and Aggression. United States Government Printing Office, 1946. 
23 Buchheim and Scherner, “The Role of Private Property in the Nazi 
Economy,” 395. 
24 Wolfe, “The Development of Nazi Monetary Policy,” 397. 
25 Robert Clement Engström, “Nazi War Finance and the German War 
Economy” (MBA, University of Pennsylvania, 1968), 45. 
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By 1936, the government also influenced where this capital 
was reinvested. One method was through the tight rationing and 
regulation of raw materials. Germany was a net importer of raw 
materials.26 Therefore the Nazis found it important to reallocate 
their scarce supply of raw materials through supervisory boards to 
help rearmament. This reallocation made it hard for companies to 
get the amount of raw materials necessary to fund their own 
projects.27 However, the Nazis would release more raw materials 
for projects deemed important for rearmament or reaching autarky. 
Thus it became profitable in many instances for companies to 
pursue the goals of the Reich. As a result, private investment in 
autarkical industries grew more than seven-fold by 1937.28 
Furthermore, even though 42% of that year’s GDP growth came 
from military spending, the private sector’s fiscal contribution to 
said GDP growth was 79%.29 However the Nazis’ reliance on the 
private sector had its limits. Companies still considered the 
potential for long term profit and it was clear that rearmament 
could not continue forever. This mentality dictated that they would 
not produce rearmament goods at as high a rate as the Nazis 
desired.30  
An ancillary effect of increased private reinvestment was 
that large investment banks lost a considerable amount of business 
since companies no longer needed industrial loans to finance new 
                                                          
26 Klein, Germany’s Economic Preparations for War; Tooze, The Wages of 
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projects.31 Consequently, companies became more dependent on 
the Reich than investment banks because the Reich controlled the 
imports of raw material that production required. The Nazis’ 
capital controls handcuffed the investment banks and they 
essentially became depositories for MeFo bills.32 Once the 
investment banks became disabled, the meaningful supply of 
money shifted to private savings banks. Again, the Reich took 
advantage. Despite a 77% increase in deposits, the banks’ loans to 
private debtors surprisingly decreased from 1933 to 1938.33 For a 
variety of reasons, the Reich could control these banks’ loans more 
than they could control those of investment banks 
 
There were three main reasons why the Reich 
reserved the refinancing power of savings banks for 
itself and why the savings banks could easily be 
moved by material incentives. First, their structure 
of long-term liabilities made such banks 
extraordinarily fit for taking on long-term loans in 
their portfolios. Although saving deposits were 
legally short-term liabilities, in aggregate they 
fluctuated only slightly so that they could be 
reinvested in long-term loans without risking 
illiquidity. Second, the Reichsbank recognised 
Reich loans as liquid assets which meant that 
savings banks could easily fulfil the liquidity 
standards of the Reichskommissar fur das 
Kreditwesen [Reich Commissioner for credit 
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business]. Third, the interest paid on Reich loans 
was significantly higher than that on private bills, 
which fell from 4.1 per cent to 3.3 per cent. 34 
 
Because of these conditions, private savings banks played a large 
part in refinancing long-term government debt as well as investing 
in rearmament industries. Their holding of government debt in 
1939 was 6.5 times higher than it was in 1933.35 These banks 
became the third major financier of the recovery after MeFo bills 
and private corporations.  
With such risky methods of financing, the confidence and 
trust of the parties involved was paramount. The Nazis needed to 
provide economic stability to keep confidence in their unorthodox 
methods high. To this end, they instituted strict wage and price 
controls. Two months after taking power in 1933, the Nazis 
eliminated collective bargaining rights and unions and replaced 
them with the Nazi affiliated German Labor Front. The role of this 
organization was to keep worker morale high through fascist 
indoctrination and middle class comforts such as vacations, 
company picnics, and Volkswagens. New laws were passed in 
early 1934 that gave government appointed labor trustees the 
power to regulate wages for whole industries.36 The Nazis 
succeeded in keeping wage rates at depression levels throughout 
the recovery, which benefitted the recovery by decreasing 
consumption and freeing corporations to produce more 
rearmament focused goods through increased earnings that had to 
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be reinvested in production per the Loan Fund Law.37 Another 
advantage was that companies’ profits would directly increase as 
technological improvements and economies of scale decreased 
production costs. These profits also meant there was more money 
available for reinvestment.  
Despite the wage controls, private consumption had to rise 
as unemployment decreased.38 As this began to occur, 
representatives from the Labor Front voiced their concern that 
workers were unhappy that price increases in consumer goods 
were not met with wage increases. In 1936 the problem worried the 
Nazis enough that they created the Office for Price Formation, 
which audited consumer businesses and told them what to charge 
for their products.39 Oversight was so strict that the Reich even 
regulated whether certain hotels could give jam with breakfast.40 
Naturally, the Nazis granted more profitable price structures to 
companies that produced more rearmament goods.41 Harsh 
punishments for evading the Nazis regulations, including 
execution, prevented the formation of large black markets. The 
Office for Price Formation is yet another example of how the 
Nazis manipulated the free market to encourage businesses to 
reduce their production of luxury goods and instead focus on goods 
necessary for autarky. As seen with their control over wages, the 
Nazis’ control over prices proved largely successful; the cost of 
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living was only 6% higher in 1938 than it was in 1933 despite 
massive economic growth.42 
While these internal policies kept the domestic economy 
stable during the mid-1930s, the stability came at the expense of 
Germany’s foreign exchange reserves. Though the Nazis aimed for 
autarky, the reality was that Germany needed to import ever-
growing amounts of food and raw materials to feed the rearmament 
economy.43 Germany had always needed to import these resources. 
However, the loss of territory mandated by the Treaty of Versailles 
exacerbated the problem, reducing Germany’s agricultural capacity 
15% for many important crops and its iron ore capacity by 75%.44 
Shortages in steel, iron ore, copper, and oil could not be met by 
increased production, necessitating the importation of those crucial 
war machine materials.45 The Nazis’ rearmament financial 
practices and labor laws crowded out investment for exports and 
consumer goods, which strained German foreign exchange 
reserves even more to compensate.46  
Whereas the Nazis’ economic policy solutions and 
financing methods kept domestic confidence high, they sent 
international confidence in its economy into a tailspin. While 
Germany’s antagonistic general foreign policy no doubt played a 
role, their financial decisions must be heavily considered in an 
analysis of their foreign trade weakness. To begin with, a 
moratorium on foreign debt payments in 1933 and a purposeful 
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default on these payments in 1934 surely did the Reich no favors.47 
It was also lost on no one that if the Reich had the funds to rearm, 
it could surely pay back its foreign debts first.48 The effect of this 
mentality was seen in early 1935 when German bond prices began 
to steadily decline on the world market until they reached rock 
bottom once war commenced in September 1939.49  
It fell to Hjalmar Schact to minimize Germany’s foreign 
trade troubles. Introduced in 1934, his collection of initiatives was 
called the New Plan. One such initiative to remedy the Germans’ 
lack of food and raw materials was to pressure weaker countries in 
Eastern Europe and South America into bilateral clearing 
agreements with Germany. Per these agreements, trade would be 
conducted either through barter or, if necessary, in RMs so that 
foreign exchange-reserves were never used.50 By 1938, clearing 
agreements had been signed with over forty countries, who 
collectively bought about 80% of Germany’s exports.51 In order to 
avoid devaluing the RM, Schacht devised a clever bond 
discounting/subsidy scheme that subsidized German exporters on 
foreign financial markets.52 With this plan, Schact was effectively 
able to give exporters the competitive advantage of currency 
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devaluation while avoiding the inherent increases in import prices 
and the national debt.  
However, with the 1935 fall in bond prices, this mechanism 
became untenable and Schacht told the army that he would not be 
able to fulfill their rising demand for imported raw materials.53 To 
remedy the situation, he had to impose a new, large tax on the 
businesses profiting from the rearmament in order to keep exports 
competitive.54 This tax proved effective; exports rose, allowing 
imports of raw materials to rise as well. The government used 
supervisory boards to control the allocation of these imports across 
the country.55 Since these imports primarily went to rearmament 
(metals) or autarkic industries (primarily food), production of 
consumer goods decreased. In fact, there was no increase in 
consumer production from 1934 to 1936 despite the economic 
growth caused by the recovery.56 
Schacht had to damage domestic happiness in order to 
shore up foreign exchange shortfalls. This would hurt the Reich 
over time as average Germans began to notice that their quality of 
life had decreased despite the country’s theoretical prosperity.57 
The idea of working for the benefit of the state was not enough to 
stop workers from asking for promotions, especially once workers 
knew that unemployment was low, making each one of them more 
valuable to their companies. To keep wages stagnant, the Nazis 
passed laws to keep workers in their current jobs and even assert 
that workers could be reassigned at will to industries with labor 
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shortages.58 The effect was that workers put in less effort and 
domestic production became less efficient.59 
As 1939 inched closer and Germany began to annex land to 
the east, Schacht had to keep rearmament growth high despite an 
ever worsening foreign trade situation and decreased efficiency at 
home. The 1938 annexation of Austria provided a much needed 
infusion of foreign exchange reserves, equivalent to 782 million 
RM, which doubled Germany’s supply.60 This allowed Schacht in 
1938 to run the largest German trade deficit since 1929.61 
However, the acquisition of Austria actually hurt Germany in the 
long run because, like Germany, Austria was an importer of food 
and raw materials.62 By the start of 1939, the Austrian foreign 
exchange reserves were exhausted.63 Schacht had to get more 
desperate with his foreign trade practices. 
Due to the Nazis’ policy for years of keeping the RM 
sheltered from the free market both domestically and abroad, it 
became increasingly difficult to value as a currency. The countries 
who had clearing agreements with Germany wanted to trade less 
with it as a result, instead preferring hard currency countries such 
as Great Britain.64 As Germany’s importation needs became ever 
greater, Schacht began to rely less on clever financial tricks than 
on outright economic bullying of Eastern European countries. The 
most extreme case was a one-sided deal with Romania he signed in 
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late 1938.65 Romania had to accept German arms exports in 
exchange for foodstuffs, oil, and other materials the German 
economy needed. This deal so strained Romania that they had to 
import raw materials themselves to keep up with the German 
demand.66 It is interesting to note that Poland, the first victim of 
the German blitzkrieg, was one country that held its ground and 
refused to make a trade deal with Germany.67 
Despite  Schacht’s efforts, Germany was unable to keep up 
with its import demands and Hitler dictated that the shortages hit 
normal Germans instead of hindering the rearmament effort. In an 
urgent letter written in January 1939, Schacht told Hitler, 
“Especially in the field of daily requirements for the home and 
clothing, the lack of supply and above all the decline of quality is 
most evident.”68 The analysis of labor historian Tim Mason puts it 
best 
 
The whole economic system was so strained that 
any one hold-up immediately caused another. These 
multiple shortages, which constituted a kind of 
negative multiplier effect, were the chief 
distinguishing mark of the situation just before the 
outbreak of war… it was a general economic 
crisis.69 
 
The confidence of the people and the confidence of businesses and 
banks was what the Reich, by necessity, valued most. Even though 
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there were food and import shortages, they were never so severe as 
to put the country at risk of starvation. Having enough food to eat 
was not the point; confidence in the Nazis was. The Nazis were 
frightened by how shortages may affect the public morale; a 
shortage would alert the average German to the frailty of the 
economy, which would damage support for the Nazis.  
While the supply shortage of early 1939 caused the 
working class to lose confidence in the Nazis’ economic prowess, 
MeFo bills did the same for businesses and banks. The MeFo bills 
that jumpstarted Germany’s miraculous recovery also threatened it 
the most. In March 1938, Schacht ended MeFo financing because 
he felt the system had gotten out of control.70 Finally Schacht had 
found a predicament from which he could not slither out. Many 
MeFo bills were also reaching maturity and the Reichsbank had to 
pay back the bills’ worth to their holders. But Hitler wanted to 
continue financing rearmament to the fullest. Schacht tried to sell 
long-term bonds to MeFo bills creditors instead of giving them 
hard cash, but they would not buy.71 His only recourse was to print 
money and run a deficit. But the rearmament campaign still 
demanded money as well. To plug this hole, in October 1938, 
Schacht tried to sell four packages of long-term bonds to the 
public, each containing 1.5 billion RM. Surprisingly, private savers 
and insurances funds bought the first three packages but the fourth 
one suffered a massive failure in late November after Schacht 
introduced it.72 The financiers of the Nazi economy had lost 
confidence a couple of months before the workers did at the start 
of 1939. 
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The result was that Schacht had to increase the money 
supply and run up a massive deficit to counterbalance the loss in 
capital and keep the rearmament going. From the start of Hitler’s 
reign to the end of MeFo bill financing, the amount of RMs in 
circulation rose from 3,560 million to 5,278 million. But from 
March to December 1938, currency circulation rose to 8,223 
million RMs, effectively rising more in ten months than it had in 
the previous five years.73 The deficit likewise rose enormously in 
this time though it had been increasing at a healthy pace 
previously. Schacht told Hitler that spending on the military would 
have to be cut or incredible inflation would ensue.74 Instead of 
listening to Schacht, Hitler fired him, electing to replace him with 
a loyal deputy named Walther Funk.75 Hitler instructed Funk to get 
prices, wages, and the foreign trade debacle under control using 
whatever means necessary.76 A short, obsequious letter written by 
Funk to Hitler regarding the status of the economy in mid-1939 
highlights the stark difference between Funk and Schacht as 
protectors of the German economy; Funk would do whatever 
Hitler demanded, regardless of the havoc it would wreak.77 In June 
1939, Hitler also abolished the Reichsbank limit for adding to the 
money supply, officially taking Germany off the gold standard it 
had speciously claimed to be on since the end of World War I.78 
After that, Funk instituted a war rationing system that gave the 
government draconian control over consumer goods with the 
justification that Germany was, or soon would be, at war. Funk’s 
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actions signaled a shift to the wartime economy that would 
generally dominate the Nazi state until its collapse in 1945. 
Taken as a whole, the Nazi economic recovery of the 1930s 
was like a balloon. The Nazis tried to fill the balloon with air but 
they could never tie the knot to keep it stable. Their choice was 
either to stop pumping air and let the balloon fizzle away or to 
keep pumping until it popped. The evidence indicates that they 
chose the latter. The Nazis’ call for immediate economic growth 
led to financing practices that produced massive short term gain 
with equally as massive long term consequences. The success of 
their policies regarding MeFo bills, the co-opting of the private 
sector, and the regulation of wages and prices all rested on 
domestic trust and confidence. While Germans trusted their 
economy for some years, the rest of the world, operating mostly on 
a free market basis, was skeptical. For an economy that relied 
heavily on imports, this was fatal. To prevent a total collapse of 
Germany’s foreign trade position, the Nazis had to make sacrifices 
that damaged domestic confidence. Eventually, these sacrifices 
became so great that confidence in the German economy faltered 
both domestically and globally, leading to an unstable economy by 
1939. 
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A Different Way of Touring Europe: One 
Aid Man’s Journey across Europe during 
World War II  
By  
Abigail Currier 
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Two hours after lights out when everyone was supposed to 
be in bed, the sound of a sole trumpet rang through the air, with the 
sound of “Taps” blending into the breeze. For the men listening, 
this song was an inspirational break from the monotony of their 
current life. It was a symbol of independence and spirit; these men 
were unbroken and refused to fully submit. All over the camp, the 
men waited for that night’s performance to start. Every evening, 
the mysterious performer had to switch locations. If the guards 
ever figured out where he was playing, the punishment would be 
severe. For the past week, this impromptu concert, usually 
followed by a couple of other, more popular tunes, was taking 
place in the least likely place in the world; approximately forty 
miles east of Berlin in the middle of Stalag III-C.  
A few weeks before, a prisoner smuggled a large box to 
Arley Goodenkauf and told him to keep it.  Confused, he brought 
the package into his barracks and, after checking around to make 
sure no one was watching him, he carefully opened the box. Inside 
lay a dented, old trumpet. After trying a few quiet notes on it, 
Arley quickly realized it was incapable of playing music. For the 
next couple of days, he spent every spare moment testing the 
instrument and attempting to patch it up. Eventually one of his trial 
breaths turned into a serviceable note. Although the trumpet was 
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not going to win any beauty competitions, it could at least produce 
music.  But Goodenkauf now had a serious dilemma. What was he 
supposed to do with a trumpet in the middle of a German POW 
camp? A trumpet is not an easy thing to conceal and with guards 
doing periodic checks of the barracks, they were sure to notice a 
trumpet sitting on his bed. His foot locker was not safe either; they 
were sure to look in there. Even if he could disguise it, what worth 
did it truly have? There were only two things that could give this 
trumpet value; its value as a tradable commodity or its ability to 
produce music. The trumpet was more of a liability than an asset 
because it was so hard to disguise. Because of this, few people 
would actually wanted it and it would not have a high trade value. 
Therefore, its worth lay in its musical capabilities. Goodenkauf had 
learned how to play the trumpet before joining the army and still 
knew some of the basics. But such activities were strictly 
forbidden by the Germans and punished severely. Was it worth it?1 
 Morale was low in the camp; winter was quickly 
approaching and the men only had a few threadbare blankets to 
guard against the cold. Heat was nonexistent in the barracks and 
most of the men spent their days languishing on their beds. Many 
nights had been spent huddled together for warmth. Daily rations 
consisted of one bowl of thin soup, more akin to flavored water 
than the thick stew that these men were used to receiving back 
home, and a few slices of bread for the evening meal. This was 
barely enough food to survive summer with. The men were 
severely underweight and needed every ounce of body fat to help 
them keep in the warmth. The only thing that was certain was a 
cold future that could include frost bite on ears, hands, and toes. 
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German winters are bitterly cold and even more so when there is 
no adequate clothing or heating. The future looked bleak.2  
Goodenkauf considered all of this and decided that the risk 
was worth it. While the men huddled together at night to stay 
warm, he thought that they deserved something positive in their 
miserable lives. So, he went out every night and performed for his 
fellow inmates. No one knew who he was and every performance 
took place in a different location to preserve his anonymity. The 
nightly music confounded the German guards, who desperately 
searched for the performer. After about two weeks, the Germans 
finally found the trumpet during one of their periodic raids of the 
barracks. The instrument was confiscated during a morning roll 
call and never seen again. However, the trumpet player managed to 
remain anonymous.3 
These concerts were one of the very few positive events 
that happened to Private Robert Bell Bradley during his time as a 
Prisoner of War. Bradley began the war as an aid man with the 30th 
Infantry Division as a part of Operation OVERLORD and ended 
his war experiences trekking across Europe. While Bradley 
struggled to survive in Axis Germany, and later in contested 
eastern Europe, global events continued apace without him. 
However, these events would have serious and lasting impacts on 
his journey. Often on his journey to freedom, Bradley, and others, 
would get caught up in the fighting between The Soviet Union and 
the United States during the degradation of relations between these 
two super powers.  
*** 
                                                          
2 Robert Bradley, “Interview with Robert Bradley.” Interview by Ryan Adams. 
Musselman Library Special Collections. 19-21.; Robert Bell Bradley, “Thoughts 
Born in a Stalag,” A Collection of Poems (n.p. 1988), Musselman Library 
Special Collections. 5; Goodenkauf , Unpublished Memoir, 8. 
3 Goodenkauf, Unpublished Memoir, 9. 
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Within the medical corps, there were clear distinctions 
between the roles of the various medical personnel. The job of the 
aid men was to stabilize the wounded and get them to a battalion 
aid station or hospital. As such, their position during battle was on 
the front line, running into the line of fire, immediately assessing 
the situation, and responding appropriately as quickly as possible. 
Aid men had to be able to do everything the infantry units they 
were assigned to were able to do. To prepare for this crucial role, 
the aid men received hybridized training that combined the training 
of a regular soldier with intensive study of medical theory and its 
application. The training covered everything from how to properly 
wrap a wound to how to fire a wide variety of weapons, both 
domestic and foreign.4 
 However, there was a desperate need for medical 
personnel in the European Theater of Operations (ETO), so this 
all-important training period could often be as short as eleven 
weeks to increase the number of medical technicians available. 
When Bradley enlisted in October of 1942, there were 324,814 
enlisted men in the Medical Department. By June of 1944 when 
Bradley landed in France, that number had jumped to 553,095 
demonstrating that this shortened training had worked to produce a 
larger number of aid men. However, the ratio of enlisted men to 
soldiers had dropped from 73.5 for every 1,000 soldiers in 1942 to 
69.2 in 1944. There was still plenty of room left for improvement.5  
                                                          
4 Bradley, “interview” 11-14; Robert Bell Bradley, Recollect and Ponder Part I 
(n.p.), Musselman Library Special Collections. 17-19; Vincoe M. Paxton and 
Stuart D. Rizika. “Soldiers of the Medical Detachment,” The American Journal 
of Nursing. 45, no. 9 (Sept., 1945): 694. 
5 There have been few historical studies regarding the roles of aid men during 
World War II. While the United States government published several 
voluminous books on the topic of the Medical Department during the second 
world war, especially during the Vietnam War era, these books rarely address 
the role played by the aid men and are very difficult for the lay person to 
understand. They are written in military and medical jargon that is often hard to 
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When Bradley enlisted in the United States Army in 
October of 1942, his only request was to be placed with a medical 
unit. Prior to enlisting, he had been enrolled in a pre-med program 
at the University of Maryland. Many of Bradley’s friends and 
classmates had either enlisted or been drafted. Bradley did not 
want to be left out of the war and felt it was his patriotic duty to 
enlist, especially considering his specialized training. So, after his 
induction on New York Avenue, Bradley was shipped to Camp 
Blanding, Florida, where he completed his basic medical training 
along with thousands of other trainees.6 Basic training for aid men 
contained all of the usual parts of basic training for normal 
soldiers. However, it was expanded to include medical and surgical 
theory and their practical application.7 After passing the requisite 
exams, the aid men were assigned to different units. He was 
eventually assigned to the 120th Infantry Medical Detachment of 
the 30th Infantry Division. Their job was to move with the unit on 
their maneuvers and provide basic aid and medical advice. In 
Ocala National Forest in Florida, that meant tending to a 
                                                                                                                                  
understand, so for general interest questions, these books should be avoided. 
Albert Cowdry’s Fighting for Food is a good book on the role played by these 
men in actual combat, but neglects their training and the building up to getting 
these men prepared to fight. Modern books on Aid men and medics in World 
War II have tended to focus more on biographical accounts rather than 
comprehensive histories. While these books are good for very specific focuses 
and may be more engaging for the general public, they are not very 
comprehensive in general history nor provide adequate background on what is 
an understudied subject. Charles M. Wiltse, Medical Department United States 
Army in World War II (Washington DC: Office of the Surgeon General 
Department of the Army, 1963), 10-13, 60-165. 
6 Bradley, Aid Man!, 14.; Bradley “Interview,” 28;  Camp Blanding in Florida 
also became home to thousands of German POWs captured by allied soldiers. 
These men provided critical agricultural labor in nearby areas. Robert D. 
Billinger Jr., “With the Wehrmacht in Florida: The German Pow Facility at 
Camp Blanding, 1942-1946,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 58, no. 2 (Oct., 
1979): 161. 
7 Paxton, 694. 
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surprisingly large number of snake bites and other small injuries. 
As Bradley and the other aid men adjusted to their new role as unit 
care giver, they rarely, if ever, had to deal with any serious or 
catastrophic wounds. Instead, they had to fight against infection in 
the large number of cuts and scrapes the soldiers acquired daily on 
their pretend missions.8 
 Blisters were also a common problem, though not as 
prevalent during regular training as they were during maneuvers. 
All soldiers had been taught and practiced basic foot care routines 
that, if followed daily, prevented serious blisters. These routines 
included drying the feet out completely, applying powder to 
maintain dryness and then layering socks as a cushion. When 
going on short maneuvers in relatively dry areas, blisters were 
rarely an issue. However, on longer marches, or maneuvers that 
would occur later in training, this regimen would not be enough. 
Bradley and the other aid men spent nearly all of their time on 
these injuries. They eventually became so proficient at it that they 
even designed a special type of pad to apply to blisters to alleviate 
the pain and allow the soldiers to return to training as soon as 
possible.9 
Preliminary training for Bradley’s unit concluded with a 
multi-day hike through Ocala National Forest. They spent several 
days in the forest where the men were expected to spend all day 
marching, often wading through streams when they encountered 
them. No one had dry feet and Bradley and the other aid men spent 
the entire day repairing damaged feet. As soon as one blister was 
wrapped, another soon appeared. The aid men used hundreds of 
bandages as their world narrowed to the size of the next foot. 
Gauze, tape, next. Gauze, tape, next. Gauze, tape, next. It felt like 
                                                          
8 Bradley, Aid Man!, 14-19.  
9 Ibid., 17- 20. 
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it would never stop. Meanwhile, Bradley’s own foot was throbbing 
from a blister he had gotten the day before. Occupied with tending 
to the blisters of his unit, he had had no time to address his own 
wound. Later that night, Bradley was finally able to tend to his 
blister. At this point, he was completely worn out from all of his 
work that day. Not only had he spent the whole day bandaging 
feet, but every time Bradley stopped to help someone, both he and 
the wounded man fell behind. After patching up the soldier, 
Bradley had to run to catch up with the unit and the next wounded. 
It had been one of the longest days of Bradley’s professional life. 
As he drifted off to sleep, Bradley’s dreams were filled with feet 
mutilated by blisters.10  
Although Bradley’s practical experience was with minor 
wounds and injuries like heat exhaustion and snake bites, as an aid 
man he was expected to master a wide range of ailments. After 
completing basic training, aid men were required to give basic 
medical information and advice to the members of the unit they 
were assigned to shadow. This information was often sought on the 
spur of the moment and covered a wide variety of ailments and 
injuries. The aid men also had to give lectures periodically to 
whole divisions on various health related topics.11 These lectures 
varied from the proper construction of a splint using nearby 
materials to proper field sanitation, including latrine location and 
construction and sterilization of mess equipment. The principle 
goal of these lessons was to train the men in how to care for 
themselves while waiting for an aid man to come.12  
*** 
                                                          
10 Bradley, Aid Man!, 17-20; Robert Bell Bradley, The Aid Man Infantry Team 
(n.p. 1995), Musselman Library Special Collections, 8. 
11 Bradley, Aid Man!, 16; Bradley, Recollect and Ponder Part I, 6. 
12 Paxton, 694. 
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After completing training at Camp Blanding in Florida and 
several weeks on maneuver in Tennessee, it was finally time for 
Bradley to ship out.13 He and the rest of the 120th boarded the 
Argentina, which was a part of a large convoy, including the larger 
troop carriers and the smaller destroyers and warship used as 
protection. Rumor had it that the entire 30th Division was on the 
convoy. Such large convoys were necessary to defend against 
attacks by German U-boats. German subs, which would attack 
single ships were reluctant to fire on large groups. The men docked 
at Firth of Clyde without too many issues. Luckily, the entire 
voyage had gone smoothly without any major incidents. The men 
passed the time in a variety of ways, including being sea sick for 
many of them. Boredom was seldom broken on the ship and 
Bradley was able to complete a fair number of poems during this 
time. Throughout Bradley’s time in the US army, he wrote a large 
number of poems and used it as a way of expressing himself. He 
would continue to write after his discharge and self-published 
several books filled with his works.14  
 As preparations for Operation OVERLORD ramped up, the 
30th Division was shifted from its original camp at Bognor Regis to 
just outside of Oxford to be closer to its embarkation point. 15 
There was very little to do at this camp but train and that got 
boring very quickly and rarely distracted the men for long. 
Baseball games became a popular past-time on the various bases 
throughout Europe. Not only did they keep the men on the base 
and thus prevented them from over running local towns, but it also 
                                                          
13 For Bradley and the 30th Division, training consisted of several weeks of basic 
at Camp Blanding, Florida and then being sent to the Smoky Mountains in 
Tennessee to go on maneuvers, which basically meant that the whole division 
spent days in the field, learning what it meant to be in a combat zone and what 
life on the front lines was like. Bradley, Aid Man!, 19-23.   
14 Ibid., 24-27. 
15 Ibid., 29-30. 
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occupied a large number of men. The games were often good 
forms of entertainment and helped to alleviate some of the 
boredom.  
 On June 6th, 1944, Bradley and the others on the base 
awoke to the sound of thousands of planes flying overhead. This 
was not entirely out of the ordinary, as the base was located next to 
an air base. However, this particular morning there were more 
planes taking off than usual. Rumors of a cross channel invasion 
had been circulating for months, but all of the men in Bradley’s 
unit had assumed that they would be a part of the landing force. 
Why else had they trained so intensively back in the States? Surely 
they would not be left behind. But, at the same time, the large 
number of planes overhead seemed to indicate that they would not 
be a part of the first wave. And yet, no one had announced 
anything and there was still a possibility that this was not the major 
invasion. This could just as easily have been a probing raid before 
the main event.  
 Bradley and the others gathered for the daily baseball game 
as if it were any other day. The players took to the field as usual, 
but it was clear that their hearts and minds were not in the game. 
Each squad of planes that flew overhead drew the gaze of players 
and spectators alike. The outfielders were more interested in these 
planes than the balls that they were supposed to be catching. No 
one seemed to care how well the game was played that day. 
Suddenly, all of the radios in camp blared to life and the news 
poured out; the landing had been a success. The invasion of France 
had begun and the Allies were beginning their long march towards 
Germany and eventually the capital, Berlin.  
 After a moment of confusion, it sunk in; the 30th had been 
excluded from the initial landing party. After all their training and 
drilling, they would not be storming the beaches of France with the 
rest of the army. A few hours later, the order was passed around; 
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the 30th would be following in the wake of the 29th Division on the 
Omaha Beachhead. Two days later, the unit was loaded back onto 
ships and left England. 16  After two years filled with training and 
waiting, the 30th was finally going into combat.  
*** 
 Two days after the start of D-Day, Bradley and his unit 
loaded on to a British ship and were sent across the English 
Channel and dropped at Omaha Beach. Even though fighting on 
the beach head itself had ended, the men still had to climb off the 
ships and wade/swim ashore. Artillery from the earlier fighting 
made this difficult for a lot of the men. Invisible to them, large 
craters had been created by shelling from the intense conflict, 
creating an uneven sea floor. The men would be fine for one 
second and then the next the weight of their equipment would drag 
them down as the sea floor dropped out from underneath them. 
 Eventually, all of the men made it to shore. They quickly 
formed into a column and headed up the road lined with 
hedgerows that the Allies had struggled to establish just days 
before. As they marched towards the 29th Division, the true cost 
and destruction of war rapidly became apparent. German corpses 
littered the sides of the road. Most were missing limbs or had some 
other horrendous wound. There had been no time to bury these 
bodies and the 30th could not afford to stop to dispose of them 
either, so they had to continue marching past these potent 
reminders of the cost of war. The Allied dead were even harder to 
see. These bodies had been hastily removed and, as a result, a lot 
of their equipment had been left behind, the most conspicuous of 
which were their helmets. A soldier never relinquished his helmet 
                                                          
16 Bradley, Aid Man!, 46. 
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as it often meant the difference between life and death. For these 
men, it no longer mattered.17  
 At the second hedgerow, Bradley encountered his first real 
casualty of World War II. Taking a squad of six men with him, 
Bradley heard the call of a young soldier who had stepped on a 
mine that blew his foot off. Bradley snapped into action. Before he 
had even fully crouched down to examine the man, he had taken 
his belt with full medical kit off of his own waist and thrown it 
down beside the wounded soldier.18 Next, Bradley reached for the 
man’s belt and quickly took that off too. Bradley then reached for 
the scissors that he kept on a string on his wrist and cut the ragged 
pant leg away from the wound. He reached for the man’s belt and 
used this as a tourniquet, quickly stopping the blood pouring out of 
the gaping wound.19 Bradley then wrapped up the exposed flesh 
before getting the squad he had brought over to escort them back to 
the battalion aid station. Bradley had just successfully dealt with 
his first battlefield injury, but there was no time to stop and 
congratulate himself. Already, the call of ‘aid man!’ pierced the air 
and Bradley was off on his next case.  
 Fighting remained intense and continued from hedgerow to 
hedgerow for the next two and a half weeks. Bradley was 
constantly in motion, trying to save as many men as possible and 
this gave him invaluable experience to not only recall his training, 
but expand it beyond all bounds. Even though he had hated 
somersaulting during training, Bradley quickly mastered it during 
his time in northern France. The easiest way to get to the wounded 
                                                          
17 Ibid., 46-48. 
18 This was a common practice of aid men during WWII because it allowed 
them to access all their equipment at once, instead of having to reach around 
their waists to get at what they needed. The kits were placed specially on their 
belts to be more accessible when the belt was laid out than when it was worn. 
Bradley “Interview,” 8-9. 
19 Ibid., 4; Bradley, Recollect and Ponder Part I 17. 
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was to go over the hedgerows and he could not afford to lose any 
time in taking a less direct route. Minutes often meant the 
difference between life and death for these men and, unlike the 
helmets Bradley had seen earlier, these men could not afford to 
wait.20  
Bradley spent these weeks treating a large variety of 
wounds. The worst were the chest wounds. In order to put enough 
pressure on the wound to slow the bleeding, Bradley and other aid 
men literally threw themselves across the soldiers while attaching 
the bandage. When they stood up, the aid man’s uniform was 
soaked with the wounded man’s blood. But there was never any 
time to clean up.   When he was able to make it back to camp, 
Bradley was barely recognizable. His uniform was soaked with the 
blood and various fluids of the men he had helped and caked with 
mud from all of his acrobats among the hedgerows. His shoes, as 
usual, were a complete mess. They were just as dirty as his 
uniform, but also shredded from all of the shrapnel and metal 
shards that he had stepped on throughout the day. The whole outfit 
would need to be replaced. Even when Bradley spent the night in 
the field tending to the wounded, a soldier would be sent to find 
him to bring replacement pieces for his uniform, saying, “Bradley, 
here’s your shoes and a shirt.”21 During this time, Bradley rarely 
slept, and when he did it was often in a fox hole that he dug 
himself. This constant action occurred unabated for several weeks 
and then continued into the month of August with only periodic 
breaks when the GIs made a break through. These break throughs 
brought a brief respite to the soldiers, but medical personnel and 
aid men continued working trying to help as many men as possible 
before the division moved to their next assignment.  
                                                          
20 Albert E. Cowdrey, Fighting for Life; American Military Medicine in World 
War II (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 253. 
21 Bradley, “Interview,” 10 
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*** 
The 30th Division eventually headed towards St. Lo, 
France. The Germans had mounted an unexpectedly strong defense 
there and the Allies were determined to break their lines. An army, 
mainly composed of Americans, had been massed just outside of 
St. Lo to confront the German Army. The offensive would begin 
with a massive bombing raid by the Allied air force to weaken the 
enemy and then the US Army would punch through the German 
lines.  
The attack had already been delayed for several days 
because it was too rainy for the fliers to see anything. Finally, on 
July 25th, six days after the attack had been scheduled, Bradley was 
lined up with the men of the 30th when General MacNair came 
over to visit the troops. He stood talking with Bradley and some of 
the other men before moving onto the next division.22 In the 
middle of their conversation, he heard the drone of Allied planes 
overhead. Sooner than Bradley expected, he heard the whistle that 
meant the planes had dropped their load of bombs. The whistling 
was much closer than expected and Bradley quickly realized that 
there was a serious problem. The men ran for cover as bombs 
started to fall around them. Bradley sprinted to the right, his eyes 
set on a fox hole that would serve as a shelter. Out of the corner of 
                                                          
22 General MacNair stopped to talk with Bradley after he had patched up two 
GIs who had suffered a rather ironic accident. The men were already nervous 
because the day before, the US Air Force had attempted a bombing attack and 
one of the squads of airplanes had accidently dropped their full load on the 
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men were pulled out of their entrenched positions and told to get into ditches 
and fox holes to await the attack. Fearing a repeat of the day before, these two 
GIs saw the same fox hole and both tried to dive in at the same time. Needless to 
say, this did not go well and they ended up stabbing one another with their 
bayonets. Bradley had just finished patching both up when General MacNair 
stopped by to chat. Bradley, Aid Man!, 65; Niall Barr, Eisenhower’s Armies, 
(New York: Pegasus Books, 2015), 388-389. 
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his eye, Bradley saw General MacNair run to the left. A flash of 
doubt crossed his mind as Bradley wondered if he had made a 
mistake in not following the general. But, in situations like this, 
doubt could cost a man his life and Bradley could not afford to 
second guess himself. He managed to make it to the fox hole and 
ride out the bombing, which was mercifully short. As soon as they 
left, Bradley crawled out of his fox hole and set about healing the 
wounded. The wounds that he treated were the exact same as if 
they had been caused by German bombs but Bradley could not 
forget that these injuries were caused by friendly fire. The worst 
part of working on that field was watching all of the bodies being 
moved away. Many had suffered bodily injury from the explosions 
and that had caused their deaths. The most pitiful, however, were 
the men who had been buried alive when their fox holes or 
trenches were hit and the earth nearby covered up their openings, 
suffocating them. There were no marks on their bodies, but they 
were dead all the same. Bradley, at this point used to the most 
gruesome of wounds, could not stand to look at those corpses as 
they were brought back from the front lines.23 While bandaging 
damaged wounds, word was eventually passed to Bradley that the 
attack was still on but his division had been pulled back because of 
their losses. He was to return to camp as soon as he could.  
Back at camp that night, Bradley heard that General 
MacNair had perished in the bombing. Apparently, his body was 
so disconfigured from the blast that at first it was hard to identify 
him. If Bradley had followed the general, his corpse would have 
been among those destroyed by the accidental attack. He realized 
                                                          
23 The Americans killed 24 and wounded 131 of their own men on July 24th and 
61 were killed and approximately 600 were wounded the second day by 
dropping these bombs in the wrong spot. Barr, 388-389.  
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how close he had come to dying and marveled at the instinct that 
had pushed him towards life instead of death.24  
*** 
 Eventually Bradley and the remnants of the 30th Division 
made it to Mortain in France, the first town they encountered that 
was relatively untouched by the war. This would not last long.25 
Hitler had ordered Field Marshall von Kluge, the German 
commander of the Normandy Front, to prepare a counter attack 
against the Americans. Von Kluge decided to move his troops west 
towards the Allies and attack several areas, including Mortain, 
France and consequently Bradley.26 When he reported for duty at 
the command center, a major and a captain from General Hobbes’s 
staff, the commander of the 30th Infantry Division, stopped Bradley 
and told him to hold back. The officers looked at Bradley and said, 
“‘General Hobbes has looked into the data on the men who waded 
in on the beach head and you are the last one. You are to be moved 
to the rear for survival... you’ve done enough.’”27 Bradley had 
basically been in constant action since landing on Omaha Beach 
over a month ago and as far as they were concerned, he deserved a 
break. While he chafed at the idea that he was not out there helping 
people, Bradley did admit that a break sounded like an enticing 
idea. Bradley spent the night at the second battalion aid station. He 
would not be allowed to rest for long. The next morning a report 
came in of a battalion stranded on a hill just outside of the town 
and there were reports of serious casualties. Bradley was pointed 
                                                          
24 MacNair’s body had been so destroyed that his corpse was only identifiable 
by the stars on his shoulders. Ibid., 389.  
25 Bradley Aid Man!, 68. 
26 Barr, 383-391; Peter R. Mansoor, The GI offensive in Europe; The Triumph of 
American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945  (Kansas: University of Kansas, 1999), 
167-170.  
27 Bradley, “Interview,” 15. 
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towards a jeep with a man leaning on it and told to take the man 
and the jeep to the hill to see what he could do to help.28  
 Bradley hopped into the jeep and he and the other soldier 
started for the hill. The closer they got to the hill, the more shells 
and bullets started flying around. By the time they reached the 
base, both Bradley and the driver were crouched beneath the 
dashboard, desperate to avoid the swarm of ammunition flying 
above their heads. Enemy and friendly fire made the trip chaotic 
and threatened to kill one, or both, of them at every turn. 
Eventually, the driver had to stop and Bradley jumped out of the 
jeep. He grabbed two of the stretchers in the back and went 
searching for the nearest wounded. Almost immediately, a machine 
gun was fired right over his head, causing him to drop the litters 
and dive into a nearby ditch. Once the firing slowed, Bradley 
picked the litters back up and slowly made his way to two nearby 
rocks that had a small space between them. Four wounded were 
laying near the rocks, so Bradley worked on them from the limited 
protection offered by the rocks and prepared them to be moved to a 
less conflicted part of the battlefield. He managed to get the four 
men back to the jeep, despite the fact that two of them had to be 
carried in litters and the other two were seriously wounded. As 
soon as everyone was loaded into the jeep, the driver floored the 
accelerator and Bradley threw himself across the wounded to 
prevent them from falling out on the bumpy road. All six men 
made it back to the small church where Bradley had spent the 
previous night. It was now set up as the battalion aid station. 
However, command soon realized that their position was rapidly 
becoming imperiled and the order was given to pull out of the area. 
Bradley and the others left the church and the village altogether 
                                                          
28 Ordinarily, aid men were not given jeeps because they might be mistaken for 
attacking forces and attacked by the enemy, so this was a strange occurrence for 
Bradley. Ibid., 15-16 
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and moved to a house a few miles away down a dirt road. The men 
quickly reestablished their aid station and then checked their fox 
holes and slit trenches. After assuring themselves that everything 
was as prepared as it could be, the men crawled into their 
respective holes and fell into a heavy sleep. The men were 
awakened to the sound of “Raus! Raus! Raus!”29 In the pre-dawn 
light, the men saw a series of shapes moving around them in the 
semi darkness. As the sun rose, it shined light on their new 
situation and the muzzles of a variety of weapons. While they 
slept, they had been surrounded by Germans and were now 
Prisoners of War.30  
*** 
Arley Goodenkauf was drafted into the United States army 
and assigned as a paratrooper. He was captured during the initial 
fighting on Utah Beach and spent several months being moved 
from one Stalag to another until he finally ended up at Stalag III C 
in September of 1944. He would stay there until the camp was 
liberated four months later by the advancing Red Army.31 
Immediately after being captured, Goodenkauf was hustled 
into a small barn where he and the other prisoners spent the night. 
The next day they were force marched to a nearby town and loaded 
into trucks. From there they were moved across Germany, staying 
briefly in various camps for a few weeks before being sent onto 
their next destination. On August 24th, they crammed into boxcars 
and began another miserable trip, this time to Stalag IV B. 
Compared to the barns, tents, and trains that he had spent the past 
ten weeks in, this camp was a relatively comfortable place to stay. 
                                                          
29 In German, ‘raus’ means out. When the Germans found the medical team in 
the fox holes, they demanded that the men climb out so they could be properly 
captured. Bradley, Aid Man!, 70-71.  
30 Bradley, “Interview,” 17. 
31 Goodenkauf, Unpublished Memoirs, 2-8. 
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There were beds to sleep in at night, showers were available, and 
there was a delousing facility. After two and a half months of 
moving around the country, everyone had picked up a variety of 
tiny pests and finally they were able to get rid of them, if only 
temporarily. Best of all, at Stalag IV B the men were fed on a 
regular schedule. Although they never got enough food, it was a 
blessing to know when food was coming and how much to expect.  
 As Goodenkauf adjusted himself to this new place and the 
luxuries it provided, he compared his weight to that of the other 
prisoners in the camp. Among the American and British soldiers in 
his compound, his weight was roughly the norm. Everyone had 
suffered some weight loss due to being a prisoner for several 
months, but most were relatively healthy. The same could not be 
said for the Russians in the next compound over. The Germans 
barely fed their Soviet prisoners and, as a result, Goodekauf was 
living next to a compound of walking skeletons.32 This was a 
common trend throughout Germany. According to Christina Streit, 
“of about 5,700,000 Red Army soldiers captured by the Germans, 
only about 2,000,000 survived the war”33 Most of the members of 
the Red Army that were captured were allowed to starve to death, 
violating the regulations set forth by the Geneva Convention.34  At 
first, he thought that this oppression had created solidarity among 
the Russians. However, as he was soon to learn, that was not 
always the case.  
                                                          
32 Goodenkauf, Unpublished Memoirs, 7-8. 
33 “Prisoner of War (POW),” Britannica Online Encyclopedia, accessed 
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On one of his first days at Stalag IV B, Goodenkauf lined 
up as usual for roll call. Across the yard, he could see the Russian 
prisoners doing the same thing. As he watched, two POWs 
emerged from one of the barracks carrying a third man between 
them. The third man appeared very frail and lacked the strength to 
take the offered food from the Germans. Instead, one of his 
supporters took the food. Arley’s heart warmed at the sight of this 
unity and camaraderie. Even in the worst of times, people were 
still able to come together and help one another out. After roll call 
was finished, Arley hung around to see if the two Russians would 
be able to get their comrade to eat anything. Instead, he watched as 
the prisoners were dismissed and the two Soviets dropped their 
fellow POW on the ground and divided up his ration. Goodenkauf 
was furious that these two men would treat a fellow prisoner so 
unfeelingly. However, when the fallen man made no sound nor 
movement to catch himself, it suddenly dawned on Goodenkauf. 
That was no man lying on the ground. That was a corpse. He had 
probably died during the night and rather than reporting it 
immediately, the two prisoners had seized the opportunity and used 
his death to their advantage.35  
Arley felt sorry for the dead man. He deserved a better send 
off than being used as a prop in a scam to get a little extra food. 
But at the same time, he worried about his own future. The 
Russians must have been desperate to exploit their fallen comrade 
as they did. Goodenkauf was doing okay now, but his future was 
more uncertain than ever and he wondered if he could ever sink as 
low as those two Russians. For Goodenkauf and the other 
American prisoners, their future was anything but certain and there 
was no guarantee that in a couple of weeks they would not be in 
the same situation and the same choice would become an option.  
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Arley spent approximately three weeks at Stalag IV B. 
During that time, he saw similar scenes play out over and over 
where the Russians plotted and schemed to get more food. 
Everyone in the Russian compound was desperate for food and 
willing to do whatever it took to get a little extra. On September 
18th, he and some of the other prisoners were loaded onto another 
boxcar and shipped to Stalag III C. As Arley changed camps, his 
future changed as well. Soon, both he and Bradley would come to 
know exactly what those Russians were thinking.36  
*** 
Bradley’s life as a POW was about to begin. After waiting 
several days outside of Mortain, the Germans began to hustle 
Bradley and the others away from the small town.37 Often, the men 
were forced to jog even though they preferred a slow pace to delay 
their departure as much as possible. It was clear to Bradley that the 
Germans were in a rush to get somewhere and they were not sure if 
they were going to make it. Years later, he learned that their goal 
had been to make it through the Falaise Gap before it closed. 
However, in the moment all that Bradley knew was that the 
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37 Bradley was told by the Germans that they had tried for several days to 
negotiate a trade with the Allies for some captured German medics. In Aid 
Man!, Bradley questioned the validity of this argument but did remember being 
held at Mortain for several days. However, in one of his later books, Recollect 
and Ponder Part I, which was written nearly a decade later, he stated that he had 
received a letter from Major Mark J. Reardon who had found a note in the 
National Archives that was carried by a German corporal. The note offered to 
exchange prisoners. It was dated the day that Bradley was captured, so it is 
possible that the aid station was taken for the deliberate purpose of trading 
medical prisoners. He also recalls that some of the medical personal were 
offered the opportunity to join the German Army as part of their medical team. 
Many of the men refused to join the Germans, but a few chose this option 
instead of going to a POW camp. This would indicate a serious lack of medical 
personnel within the German military and led credence to their story that a large 
number of them had been captured by the Allies. Bradley, Aid Man!, 72; 
Bradley, Recollect and Ponder Part I, 37-65.  
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Germans demanded that he run and that was the last thing he 
wanted to do.38  
 The Germans were so desperate to reach their destination 
that they even commandeered a truck one morning to drive the 
prisoners across the French countryside and to German territory. 
There were a number of risks involved in being in a vehicle, 
including the frequent Allied bombing attacks that targeted modes 
of transportation. Bradley could not forget his bumpy ride in a jeep 
at the Battle of Mortain and how he and the infantry man barely 
escaped with their lives. He prayed that this ride would end better 
than that one had. As it happens, the road that Bradley was driven 
down was virtually deserted, making their vehicle easy to spot and 
target. Suddenly, the air filled with the drone of planes and the 
whistle of bomb being dropped. The driver was forced to take 
evasive action to escape the bombardment. He veered off onto a 
tiny dirt road and everyone dove off of the truck. The Germans 
organized the prisoners into lines and had them lay down in rows 
in the ditches along the sides of the road with a German soldier at 
each end of the line. All of the men braced themselves for impact. 
Luckily, the road the driver had selected had lots of tree cover and 
the men and vehicle were shielded from the eyes of the bombers. 
However, the fliers continued to target the main road that Bradley 
had been on trying to make it impassable for vehicles. The 
bombing lasted for the rest of the day, and into the beginning of the 
                                                          
38 The Falaise Gap, also known as the Falaise Pocket, was a region in the ETO 
between the American and British armies. Initially, the two forces had been 
converging to form a wall that would trap a large number of Germans and 
prevent their escape into Germany. However, the American forces were moving 
too fast and some of their commanders feared overextending part of the line and 
thus weakening it. So, the Americans halted and left a large space through which 
many Germans escaped, including Bradley and his captors. Barr, 392-393; 
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night as the Allies poured bombs onto the road in their pursuit of 
total destruction.  
 As the sun was setting, the noise finally stopped and it 
seemed like the bombardment had finished. The men slowly stood 
up, wary of another attack. Americans and Germans together 
looked at the damage that resulted from a few hours’ worth of 
bombing. Trees had been destroyed and the road was barely 
recognizable. Bradley could not recall if there had been a stone 
wall along the roadside before, it certainly was not there now. Both 
the Germans and the Americans soon came to the same conclusion; 
it was suddenly more than possible that the Germans could lose 
this war. If the Allies brought that kind of destruction to the 
fatherland, Germany would be forced to collapse. For many of the 
Germans, this was a new thought, and a rather frightening one.  
 The Germans also quickly came to the conclusion that 
daylight was no longer safe. A group as large as theirs was sure to 
attract attention from fliers and there was no way to be sure that if 
they got caught in another bombing that they would all survive. 
Instead, even thought it would be slower and more difficult, the 
Germans decided to move the prisoners only at night to avoid 
attracting another bombing mission.39  
*** 
After several weeks of forced marching through the 
German countryside, Bradley and the other prisoners made it to the 
French city of Amiens. While there, the men were kept in the city 
prison until they could be moved to their next destination. For the 
first time since being captured, they were given beds to sleep in 
rather than a barn floor. The men had finally reached a place where 
they could stay for a while and there would be no more marches at 
night to avoid allied planes. Instead, the men would be able to keep 
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regular hours and sleep at night instead of stumbling in the dark 
along dirt roads. 
 Bradley’s first morning at Amiens was very rough as he 
and the other prisoners were woken early by the sound of German 
guards ordering them to fall out for roll call. After being counted, 
Bradley and the other men in his barracks were organized into a 
work detail and marched out of camp. Before leaving, the group 
was surrounded by guards, presumably to prevent any ideas of 
escape, and brought to an area of the city that had been heavily 
damaged by Allied bombers. Through a combination of elementary 
German and pantomime the guards explained to the men what was 
expected of them. They were to clear the zone of all the rubble 
created by the destruction. The Germans wanted the roads and 
walkways cleared to facilitate the moving of supplies and all of the 
debris sorted by material. Bradley and the others balked at this 
idea; Allied fighters had risked their lives to cause this disruption 
and the Germans were expecting Allied prisoners to clean it up. 
The point of these attacks was to slow down and hinder the 
German war machine; to force them to waste their own labor on 
correcting the damage. It was certainly not planned to give work to 
POWs. Bradley detested the idea of helping the Germans, so he, 
and the others, did as little work as possible while in the town. All 
of the men moved as slowly as they could. This was partly an 
involuntary instinct born of weeks of hunger; the men had become 
accustomed to trying to conserve energy at all times.40 But this 
lethargy was also intentional. There was no incentive, monetary or 
otherwise, to complete a certain amount of work within the city so 
the men strove to be as unproductive as possible.41 The lethargy 
                                                          
40 Bradley, Aid Man!, 75-76. 
41 According to the Geneva Convention of 1929, all POWs were entitled to some 
level of pay. The amount was generally fixed at whatever the POW’s rank 
equivalent made but the rules varied depending on if the person in question was 
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was a part of this but they also had several other strategies to slow 
down work. Rather than all of the men using one central pile for 
the debris, each created his own piles away from the others. In this 
way, rather than efficiently moving everything to one central 
location, all of the debris simply migrated to a new home. It was 
often hard to tell what was a pile and what had yet to be moved so 
the same piece of rubble could move between several piles in one 
day as the prisoners tried to ‘clean’ it up. So, although the street 
looked like it was filled with motion nothing was actually being 
accomplished. Bradley and the others continued to do this for 
several weeks.42  
*** 
That morning started the same as every other morning at 
Amiens; with the call to fall out for roll call. The day before, 
Bradley and some of the other prisoners had been told they were 
being transferred and to be prepared to leave the next day. The 
selected prisoners followed the work detail as they left for the day. 
Instead of going to the street that was to be cleared that day, they 
were marched to the train station in town and loaded onto a box 
car. Once all of the prisoners had boarded, the train left for their 
mysterious destination. As the train started to move, gaps in the 
walls of the car let fresh air in. Bradley felt the coolness of the air 
as it passed by him and he knew that winter was not far off.  
Once the doors to the car were locked, most of the men did 
not have the energy nor the balance to remain standing while the 
                                                                                                                                  
an officer or not. Officers could not be forced to work while enlisted men could. 
However, the Axis powers tended to disregard the rules and did not often pay 
their POWs for their labor. When ex-prisoners, like Bradley, returned to the 
States, they were expecting to receive their back logged salary which the 
government had not made provisions for. Walter Rundell Jr. “Paying the Pow in 
World War II,” Military Affairs 22 no. 3 (Autumn 1958), 121; Convention at 
Geneva, 27-34.  
42 Bradley, Aid Man!, 75-76.  
~ 65 ~ 
 
train was in motion. One by one, they began to lay down on the 
floor each trying to get their own space. The prisoners quickly 
realized that they could not lay down haphazardly where ever they 
pleased. There was simply not enough room in the box car unless 
everyone laid down on their sides in long rows all pressed together. 
Any movement created a ripple effect. They were all so close 
together that in order for anyone to move, everyone had to mimic it 
to create the necessary space.  
Bradley quickly joined the rest of the men on the floor. He 
wanted to take advantage of the relative peace that existed within 
the box car and catch up on some sleep. However, peace was hard 
to come by considering Bradley was forced to roll over every thirty 
or so minutes to accommodate one of the other prisoners in the box 
car. He soon realized that it was going to be a long ride to where 
ever it was that they were going.43  
 Upon entering Limburg, the men were sent to Stalag XII 
A.44 Inside, their first stop was at the delousing stations where they 
took hot showers to kill off the bugs. At the same time, their 
clothes went through a special dryer to give the lice in the clothes 
the same treatment. Next, the newly cleaned prisoners formed a 
line in front of a long table. When Bradley finally made it to the 
front, a German officer thrust a piece of metal on a chain to him. 
Before he could examine it and ask what it was, the guards forced 
him along and the next guy in line was getting the same treatment. 
While hustling him away, the guards indicated that Bradley should 
put the chain around his neck. When he did so and let go of the 
piece of metal, he realized that it was a similar shape to his dog 
tag. Stamped into it were the numbers 86042. It was his POW 
identification number. In this and other camps, every POW 
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captured by the Germans was assigned an identification number. 
Each number was stamped into a piece of metal and the GIs were 
expected to wear it at all times. This new tag always hit Bradley’s 
regular dog tags and created a soft ping whenever he moved. 
Bradley and the others hated their tags because it felt too much like 
they were in the German Army. That clinking would follow him 
across Europe and served as a constant reminder of his capture by 
the Germans. After being processed, Bradley and many others 
were put on a train bound for places unknown.45   
*** 
After spending what felt like several days being moved 
from one train to another, Bradley and the other prisoners got off 
of the train expecting to be immediately herded onto the next one. 
Instead, they were surrounded by guards and marched down the 
road away from the train station. The guards led the men to the 
most desolate place that Bradley had ever seen. Dozens of short, 
long buildings were surrounded by fences topped with barbed wire. 
Placed periodically within the wall were guard towers, each 
manned by large spot lights and heavily armed Germans. The 
guards forced the men to pass under their gaze as they entered the 
gates of Stalag III C.  
As Bradley took his first look at the camp, he noticed that 
there were no plants within the compound. No trees grew to 
provide shade nor any grass to carpet the ground. The Germans 
had even managed to defeat the tenacious weed that always 
managed to grow everywhere.46 If a plant that had evolved to 
survive in some of the least hospitable environments in the world 
could not live here, how was a lonely boy from DC expected to 
make it?  
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*** 
Bradley and the other men were brought into the camp and 
processed. They were assigned to three room barracks with each 
room holding between twenty-seven and thirty-three prisoners. 
There was one lone bulb in each room to provide light at night. 
However, this only lasted until 9 o’clock when all the lights were 
turned off and the men were expected to be in bed. Just before 
lights out, the men would spend a few minutes catching all the lice 
and other bugs crawling on them and worked together to crush 
them using their finger nails. Along with the light bulb, the only 
other amenity in the barracks was a lone stove that rarely had 
enough coal. The men often spent the nights huddled together 
under thin blankets, hoping to survive the night. Morning brought 
little respite for the men, who were ordered out into the freezing 
yard to be counted. Those lucky enough to have some food were 
allowed to eat it and then they returned to their barracks to pass the 
day.  When food was available, it was often of very poor quality. 
The prisoners got a small cup of watery soup made almost 
exclusively of sauerkraut for lunch. For supper, they would 
occasionally get a potato, turnip or rutabaga if they were lucky and 
a slice of bread, the equivalent of 1000 grams.47 All of the food in 
the camps was very strictly rationed and controlled, as it was in the 
rest of Germany. 48 Due to this rationing, the bread that the 
                                                          
47 Bradley, “Interview” 19-21; Goodenkauf, Unpublished Memoir, 8. 
48 Rationing all over Germany began in 1939 before the fateful invasion of 
Poland but increased dramatically after the failed invasion of Russia. Desperate 
for food, the Germans had originally planned on utilizing their conquered 
territories as an unlimited supply of food and other crucial supplies for the 
German War Machine. This plan ultimately failed, in no small part due to the 
intense fighting that these regions suffered. In order to acquire the necessary 
food, the Germans in 1942 decided to invade Russia, a comparative bread basket 
to the food that Germany was operating with. The initial invasion was projected 
to last approximately three months, after which all of the food of Russia would 
be made available to the Nazi Regime. As history tells us, this was not quite 
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prisoners received was often of extremely poor quality. Flour, and 
grain in general, were in high demand across Germany, so the 
smallest amount possible was used to create the prisoners’ bread. 
To supplement the meager amount of flour used, the Germans 
mixed saw dust and wood chips into the batter to thicken it and 
prepare it for baking.49  Although nearly unpalatable, when the 
men were starving, it was better than nothing. The occasional snap 
pea, if they had any, was reserved strictly for Sundays. The call of 
‘Meat!’ was a cause for celebration as meat had become a precious 
commodity within the camp.50  
During their forced march to get to Stalag III C, food had 
been a rare commodity and the men often went days in between 
meals.51 When Bradley finally arrived at the camp, he expected 
that they would be fed on a more regular schedule. While this did 
occur, the amount of food that the men were receiving was 
minuscule compared to what their bodies required. The American 
POWS never reached the level of starvation experienced by the 
Russian prisoners, who were specifically targeted for starvation 
and deliberately received an insufficient amount of food. Red 
                                                                                                                                  
accurate and the Germans never successfully exploit the food reserves they 
imagined were waiting for them in Russia. Instead, rationing ramps up and 
seriously affects POW. Combined with the sharp increase of POWs in the early 
1940’s and this overall lack of food supplies, POWs were fed the bare 
minimum. The Nazis believed that any food given to POWs was taken from the 
mouths of German citizens and this was unacceptable. Lizzie Collingham The 
Taste of War; World War II and the Battle for Food (New York: The Penguin 
Press, 2012), 164- 359. 
49 At the beginning of Bradley’s internment, the wood used in the bread was 
often taken from fresh trees, meaning it was free of chemicals. Towards the end 
of the war, even this became limited and the Germans resorted to using 
processed woods. Bradley speculates that they may have needed to resort to 
telephone poles. Regardless, this change had a major impact on the men’s health 
as their diet now contained a wide variety of poisonous chemicals. Bradley, 
“Interview,” 19. 
50 Ibid.; Goodenkauf, Unpublished Memoir, 8. 
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Cross packages often contained gifts of food and the POWs used 
this to supplement their diets and fend off starvation.52 
*** 
Unlike Amiens, there was no work required of the prisoners 
at Stalag III C. Other than falling out for roll call when called, 
nothing was expected of the men and consequently they had a lot 
of free time on their hands. The prisoners learned to adapt and 
found activities to occupy themselves. Some of the Red Cross 
packages had included packs of cards, so many them passed their 
days sitting on the floor of the barracks playing cards. Bradley 
occasionally played a hand or two, but when the stakes got too 
high he left. Often, the men cleared a space on the floor and put 
pieces of straw in the middle. For some, that was all that they had 
to bet with. For others, that was the highest they were willing to 
go. The games were supposed to just be a fun way to pass the time. 
It was when the men threw down cigarettes or food as their bet that 
some of the lower betters left, including Bradley.  
During one card game, Bradley was sitting on the floor of 
the barracks with some other men playing a round of poker. The 
betting was very low stakes. So far, only straw had been thrown 
into the betting circle. After several rounds of this, another prisoner 
joined the group. The new comer was given the honor of placing 
the first bet. Instead of grabbing a nearby piece of straw, the new 
prisoner took a cigarette out of his pocket and placed it in the small 
clearing. His audience paused, unsure of what to do next. Bradley 
and one of the other men quickly got up and left the game. Bradley 
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went to search for one of the few books that were available at the 
camp. Even though he had read most of the ones that the prisoners 
had access to, anything was better than wasting cigarettes on such 
a pointless activity. While he walked away, the rest reluctantly 
reached for their own packs. For many cigarettes were too valuable 
to risk in such a way. They were the only form of currency among 
the prisoners and worked with some of the guards. Bradley had 
even heard a rumor that a prisoner with a full carton of cigarettes 
could bribe his way not only out of the camp but also out of 
Europe. As such, many men, Bradley among them, requested large 
numbers of cigarettes when they wrote to their families. No 
packages ever arrived and the prisoners assumed that the guards 
had stolen them because of their valuable contents. Red Cross 
packages did occasionally contain cigarettes but there were never 
enough to make a whole carton. Regardless, Bradley held onto that 
dream and jealously guarded his supply.53  
Cigarettes were also better than cash inside of a POW 
camp. A few slipped to one of the guards equaled a few extra 
pieces of food that night or some other small comfort. Extra coal 
for the furnace or another bottle of soap could make the difference 
to a Prisoner of War. Bradley lived among these men for several 
months and knew just how desperate they were.  
Some of the men in the camp were desperate for things 
other than food or small comfort. These men were addicted to 
smoking. Tobacco had always been readily available in the army.54 
For many of the men, Stalag III C was the first time that they were 
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life even when Americans left for combat. Even the rations given to men in 
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without a steady supply of the substance. Many did not know how 
to handle it and some went to drastic measures to get the fix that 
they craved. When Bradley first entered Stalag III C, he had 
noticed how barren and lifeless it was. Initially, he had blamed the 
lack of flora on the Germans, but he later found out that it had 
actually been caused by some of the heavy smokers in camp. In 
their desperate need, several had gathered up all of the plants and 
dried them out. They then tried smoking the leaves, often with 
poor results. However, that solution did not last very long. Once 
the plants were gone, the men started chipping away some of the 
posts and beams inside of the barracks. They took the resulting 
wood chips and tried to smoke them in crude pipes. This too did 
not end well but that never stopped the prisoners. In some areas, 
their carving was so extensive that posts became unstable and the 
other prisoners had to force the smoker to stop for everyone’s 
safety.  
The smoking of wood chips was the act of a man in need, 
but it was not the most desperate thing that Bradley witnessed. 
While in the camp, he saw several prisoners trading their rations to 
other prisoners for some cigarettes. In an environment where their 
next meal could literally make the difference between life and 
death that action alone told Bradley how desperate some of these 
men were.   
As one of the aid men in camp, Bradley was expected to, 
and felt obligated to, help the sick and wounded as much as he 
could. Even though he rarely had any supplies, he tried to offer 
what assistance he could. Due to this compassion, Bradley spent 
many nights sitting with the smokers when their newest 
experiment went horribly wrong. Although he could not provide 
any actual medical aid, he offered what encouragement he could.55  
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*** 
 After days filled with hearing rumors about the advance of 
the Soviet Army, on January 31st, Bradley and the other prisoners 
got the order they had been dreading. The next morning the entire 
camp would be evacuated. Prisoners were expected to gather their 
belongings and be prepared to move out immediately following 
roll call. Across the compound, in the rec hall, Goodenkauf and the 
other performing prisoners realized that their time had come. For 
several weeks, they had been digging a hole to store supplies and 
hide in.56 That night, they moved their belongings into the hole and 
the following morning Goodenkauf and the others climbed in. 
Another of the prisoners put a metal plate over the hole and moved 
the stove onto it to cover and disguise the opening.  
 Meanwhile, the prisoners outside of the rec hall were doing 
all that they could to delay their departure. They were successful 
for over two hours. However, at approximately 10 o’clock, the 
guards set up machine gun nests within the camp. The prisoners 
were given two choices; either they could form into a column and 
move out, or the guards would open fire. A column was quickly 
formed and the prisoners were marched out. They followed the 
road out of the prison gates. For many of the men, this was the first 
time in months that they were not surrounded by fences and barbed 
wire. Even though the men wanted to stand and look around at 
land not enclosed by fences, the German soldiers kept forcing them 
along. The Germans needed to make it away from the Stalag 
before the Russians arrived. Unbeknownst to them, an advanced 
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unit of the Russian army had come up to the camp and surrounded 
it with tanks. The column of POWs was marched straight into a 
line of Russian tanks. 57  
 The Soviet army saw the first line of German guards and a 
large column of men marching towards them. Thinking that these 
men were all German soldiers, they opened fire. Guards and 
prisoners alike dove into the snow under the sudden barrage of 
tank fire. The Germans quickly gathered up their charges and 
herded them back towards camp. The prisoners followed without 
any issues as the thought of immediate death put any plans of 
escape out of their minds. Several of the prisoners were forced to 
help some of their comrades back as they had been wounded 
during the onslaught.58 Once back behind the wire fences, the 
Germans hurried to organize a second evacuation. All of the 
prisoners were lined up again and the Germans prepared to march 
them out of camp using a different gate.  
 This time, the Germans barely made it past the fence before 
they saw Russian tanks on the horizon. Once again, the men ran 
back for the relative security of the camp and the Germans 
prepared to defend the camp against the invaders. Meanwhile, the 
prisoners were permitted to wander around the compound and 
many returned to their barracks. While in there, Bradley watched 
as the Russians overran the camp and defeated the few Germans 
who tried to defend the Stalag. The Russians executed nearly all of 
the guards as they swept through the camp. However, German 
reinforcements quickly arrived at the compound and opened fire on 
the Russians. The POWs were caught in the no man’s zone of a 
battle with the Germans on one side and the Russians on the other. 
Bullets and artillery shells flew through the air from both 
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directions, making any area outside a serious hazard. Bradley and 
another man inside his barrack tried to sneak a look outside 
through their window and came face to face with a German fighter 
pilot. The flier was down so low that Bradley’s head was about 
even with the barrels of the machine guns attached to the plane. 
Both men dropped to the floor moments before the gunner opened 
fire. It was at that moment that Bradley, and many others, decided 
that the camp was too dangerous to stay in and made preparations 
to leave.59  
 The next morning, nearly all of the soldiers retraced their 
steps from the day before and walked out of the gates of Stalag III 
C, but this time for the final time. The large mass soon divided up 
into smaller groups as everyone migrated towards their friends. 
This arrangement also worked out better for foraging needs. The 
Russians had few supplies and preferred to live off the land. They 
expected the former prisoners to do the same. It was easier to 
forage with a group of ten men than with a group of a hundred, so 
the men broke apart.60  
 Bradley eventually joined a group of seven to nine other 
GIs. The group contained a mixed cast of characters, including a 
man who spoke English, German and Polish, an Irishman who was 
very handy and a Mexican who was very adept at survival. 
Together they started what was bound to be a very long walk.61 
*** 
 As Bradley and the others made their way across Europe, 
they realized they were going to need to find a source of food, and 
quickly. They were completely on their own and had to adapt to 
survive. The Russians had not prepared to liberate any POW 
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camps and consequently had no infrastructure in place to deal with 
them.62 The men spent most nights in abandoned barns, sleeping in 
the hay. The Russians, who had moved through the area some 
weeks before, had eaten all of the available food. All that was left 
was the feed bin for the livestock. This was barely palatable food 
as the grain it contained was very course. However, the men 
stewed it with large amounts of water to make an oatmeal 
substitute that served their needs. The men ate this meal as often as 
they could because the Russian Army had left no other option and 
food was scarce. The Russians had moved through the Polish 
countryside like a plague of locust until nothing was left; no 
produce nor livestock had survived their onslaught.63  
 The only thing that seemed to have survived were a few 
chickens scattered in various areas. These were often unavailable 
as they were often already claimed by Russian soldiers staying 
nearby and being caught with one of their chickens was paramount 
to a death sentence. One night though, after they had finished their 
evening gruel but before they had bedded down for the night, the 
men decided that they wanted a little meat to round out their meal. 
On their way to the abandoned house they were spending the night 
in, the men had passed a chicken coop and had seen a few chickens 
milling around outside. Even just talking about having meat made 
some of the men salivate; they had not had any for several weeks 
and that which they had had was of a questionable nature, whose 
origins were unclear.  
 The men all gathered together to discuss their strategy. It 
would not be enough to simply walk into the coop and grab a 
chicken. Even if they managed to grab the animal by the neck and 
silence it, it would still flap its wings and wake the other birds who 
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would then set up a ruckus. Under normal circumstances, this 
would not be an issue, but the noise would inevitably wake a 
nearby Russian who would roll over in his sleep and let loose a 
burst of gunfire at the chicken coop to dissuade potential thieves. 
The unarmed men wanted to avoid this fate at all costs.  
 One of the men in the group, a Mexican, was particularly 
adept at catching chickens and explained the correct procedure to 
the rest of the group. Rather than killing the bird inside of the 
coop, the trick was to slip a finger right under the feet of the 
chicken along the pole it was roosting on. The chicken’s feet 
would then instinctively curl around the finger and the thief would 
be able to walk out of the coop with the sleeping bird on his finger. 
Once far enough away, the animal’s neck could be rung and 
preparations for the feast could begin.64  
 Bradley and a few others followed the Mexican’s 
suggestion and managed to capture several chickens unobserved 
and prepared a thick stew with hearty amounts of meat. As they 
were sitting down to eat, a loud noise sounded outside of the 
building and the front door came crashing down. Before the men 
could run for cover, a Russian patrol, made up of both men and 
women, streamed into the room with all of their guns aimed at 
Bradley and his men. One of the women demanded to know if the 
men were Germans. Based on the way the rest of the soldiers were 
deferring to her, Bradley determined that she was probably their 
commanding officer. Giving her the wrong answer at this point 
meant death by firing squad. Germans were forbidden from 
gathering and if these soldiers thought for a moment that Bradley 
and his men were German, they would shoot without asking any 
further questions. Better a dead mistake than a live German. 
Bradley and the others in his group all started yelling 
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‘Amerikansky’ at the top of their lungs. They assumed that it 
meant American in Russian, but none of them were sure if it 
actually meant anything. It had worked with earlier patrols and 
they desperately hoped that it would work now. Bradley saw 
confusion enter some of the Russian’s eyes and many of their stern 
faces softened. However, the guns were still pointed at the group 
and Bradley had run out of ideas. Suddenly, the Irishman in the 
back called out, “‘Give her a chorus of ‘Pistol Packin’ 
Momma’!’”65 All of the men started singing the popular tune. The 
Russians were stunned; they were unprepared for this new line of 
attack. Suddenly, the officer in charge broke into a huge grin and 
started laughing. She lowered her weapon and holstered it. Her 
soldiers followed her lead and put their own guns away. The 
atmosphere quickly changed from one charged with tension to one 
of revelry. The Russians started celebrating and a quiet dinner 
developed into a fully formed party.  
 As the party started to get into the swing of things, Bradley 
noticed one of the female soldiers slip out the front door. She 
returned moments later with one of the extra gas cans that were 
stored on the backs of all jeeps. For the British and the Americans, 
these tanks were for storing emergency gasoline. For the Russians, 
they were for emergency vodka. Bradley had seen Russians getting 
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drinks from these tanks and knew that they had contained a toxic 
mix of gasoline and vodka that kept the Russians going but made 
every other soldier ill. The girl put the tank down on a table. 
Another girl saw the tank and poured herself two glasses. Seeing 
Bradley, she made a beeline straight for him.  
 Bradley started to worry again. Not only did he rarely 
drink, but when he did he certainly never ordered a cocktail of 
vodka and gasoline. The girl tried offering him the drink several 
times and each time he refused he got increasingly nervous. 
Bradley never forgot that the Russians were often trigger happy 
and that they were armed and he was not. After several tries, the 
girl became frustrated and started yelling at him that he had 
disrespected Mother Russia, Stalin, and all things Russian. At the 
same time, she grabbed one of the submachine guns that one of her 
comrades and brought in and began waving it at Bradley. She kept 
threatening to shoot and he knew that she was more than capable 
of it.  
 Suddenly, one of Bradley’s men ran up to them. He had 
seen what was going on from across the room and thought he could 
help defuse the tension. The man started talking rapidly to the girl 
in Polish, trying to explain the situation. Bradley watched as her 
expression changed from one of anger to one of confusion and then 
she suddenly burst out laughing. Shaking her head, the soldier 
wandered off, still laughing, to a knot of other Russian soldiers. 
She started chatting with them and turned around to point at 
Bradley several times. When she finished her story, they too burst 
out laughing.  
 Confused and still a little worried, Bradley turned to the 
other guy to ask what he had told the girl. Chuckling, the man 
responded that he had told the soldier that Bradley was from a 
crazy Baptist sect whose church forbade him from drinking 
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anything other than water. Bradley started laughing at the absurdity 
of it and the rest of the night passed without incident.66  
*** 
Several weeks later, their Polish guide led Bradley and the 
rest of the group into yet another small town in the Polish 
countryside. As they were trying to get their bearings, several 
Russian soldiers emerged and surrounded the group. Bradley was 
used to this and explaining that they were Americans, 
Americanskys, and just wanted to return to their countrymen.67 As 
he prepared to deliver his speech, Bradley noticed that none of the 
Russians had their guns pointed at the group. This in itself was 
strange considering how all the way from Stalag III C to here any 
Russian soldiers they had met had assumed the group was German 
and only quick thinking and smooth talking had kept the group 
from an early grave. For some reason though, these soldiers were 
trying to get Bradley and his friends to follow them. This too was 
abnormal as the Russians usually preferred to shoot onsite instead 
of trying to relocate their victims. Although wary of some sort of 
trick, Bradley knew that when angered, a Russian’s first instinct 
was to shoot and Bradley certainly did not want that. He and the 
others resignedly followed the soldiers. They were led to a large 
compound with a train station at the center. At first, the men feared 
that they had been brought to another POW camp. Sensing a trap, 
Bradley and the others started to worry even more. However, an 
interpreter was quickly brought over and explained to the 
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bewildered group that this was a collection center. From here, the 
men would take a train to Odessa and from there a ship would 
return them to Allied lines.  
 Hardly believing that their ordeal was over, Bradley and the 
others allowed themselves to be herded onto a flat car. The men 
spent most of the trip believing that there had been a mistake and 
that there was no way they were really headed home. Others feared 
a German attack against the train and prepared to flatten 
themselves on the ground to avoid gun fire and bombs. At one 
point, the men even discussed the best way to jump from a train. 
Wandering in the wilderness was preferable to getting shot or 
recaptured for some of the men. Despite the various fears, the 
worst enemy the men faced was the cold. The cars they rode were 
meant for cargo and had not been designed for human passengers. 
Consequently there was no insulation and the men huddled 
together for warmth. However, soon even that was not enough and 
they resorted to using plywood, tarpaulin or anything else they 
could find as blankets. By the time they arrived at the next station, 
the men looked more like a pile of garbage than actual human 
beings.  
 Bradley and the others had been told they would need to 
switch trains part of the way through their trip to Odessa. They 
stopped in a small town and were moved to their next vehicle. The 
new car they were loaded onto was absolutely gorgeous. It was the 
first train that Bradley had been on since being captured that had 
been designed and furnished with humans in mind. There were 
large piles of fresh straw for the men to sleep on and a furnace in 
the center of each car to help the men warm up. And, best of all, 
none of the cars were overcrowded. Each only contained about 
twenty or so men and Bradley knew from bitter experience that a 
car such as this could hold far more than that. Everyone got their 
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own space and were all able to spread out for a nice nap within the 
car.  
 As the train neared Odessa, the temperature inside of the 
car steadily dropped. Despite the heat created by the furnace, many 
of the men started to feel the cold. Their car was not fully insulated 
after all. When the train stopped and the doors opened, Bradley 
saw the reason why. While they had been traveling, a snow storm 
had blown into Odessa and worked itself into a blizzard. The snow 
was falling fast and heavy, making it very difficult to see anything. 
The men quickly gathered together and followed their Russian 
guides away from the train station. Scared of getting separated 
after making it this far, the men stayed within hands reach of each 
other as they were led down the street to a large building. Heavily 
armed Russians stood outside of the building and watched as the 
former prisoners filed past. They were shown to a room where the 
men were expected to sleep on the floor together. At this point, 
Bradley and the others were used to this arrangement and quickly 
drifted off.  
 The next morning, Bradley expected to be woken early for 
roll call, but no such call came. Every day at Stalag III C had 
begun with roll call and it felt strange to be back under guard and 
not need to fall out. The men were left to their own devices until 
after lunch when the Russians took them outside, still under guard, 
to walk around several blocks for exercise before returning to the 
compound. Walking around Odessa, Bradley saw the destruction 
wrought by German fliers and saw the large piles of rubble that 
used to be buildings. For a moment, Bradley flashed back to 
Amiens and thought that he was expected to clear the area of 
rubble. When he paused to look, it was a Russian voice yelling for 
him to catch up, not a German one. Bradley had to remind himself 
that he was looking at Russian buildings, not German ones and no 
work was expected of him here. He quickly fell back in line. The 
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guards stayed with the men all day and all night both to act as 
protection and to ensure that the men could not leave. Negotiations 
were underway with the Americans and the British and the 
Russians did not want to lose their bargaining chips. Bradley and 
the others had survived Stalag III C and a trek across Europe in 
their pursuit for freedom. Now, they were stuck back under guard 
by a foreign power without any control over their own lives. 
Bradley and the others hoped that this really was the end of their 
ordeal and not the start of a new chapter.68  
 Eventually, the men were given the good news; a ship was 
waiting in the harbor to take them back to their own lines. 
Negotiations had broken down between the Russians and the 
Americans, but the British, who also had former prisoners waiting 
to be returned, had sent a man to negotiate their return. The British 
were more successful than their American counterparts and the 
Russians told their captives to expect to leave shortly after meeting 
with the British representative. Bradley and the others were more 
than excited to leave, as bombings on Odessa had picked up again 
and they desperately wanted to escape before they became a part of 
the rubble covering the city.  
 The next day, all of the men were marched from the 
building they had been staying in and were brought down to the 
docks. On their way there, they passed a large, gleaming ship. The 
Russians told them, filled with pride, that that vessel was going to 
take Premier Stalin to Yalta to meet with other officials. Next to 
the Russian ship was the British liner that was to take the men 
home.69 Even though it was not as new nor as shiny, Bradley and 
the others believed that their ship was more magnificent than 
whatever vehicle Stalin chose to cross the Black Sea in. 
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 The trip itself was relatively uneventful and after more than 
a day at sea, the ship finally docked at Naples, Italy. British 
officers soon took charge of the men and checked them over. The 
men were all interviewed and given medical exams and then fed. 
During the exam, those with the worst medical cases were 
immediately separated and flown to hospitals in the U.S. to give 
them the best shot of surviving. The rest of the men were forced to 
wait for a ship that would return them to America. The GIs took 
advantage of the brief holiday and went off to explore Pompeii. 
Bradley, however, could not join them because he had cut his foot 
and it had become infected, making it very difficult to walk. He 
instead spent several days in bed, resting up and taking medicine to 
kill the infection.70  
 Several days after their arrival in Naples, an American ship 
arrived to take the men home.71 Once aboard, the captain of the 
ship spoke over the loud speaker and explained the situation to the 
men. The ship would be sailing alone across the Atlantic alone and 
would not be a part of a convoy. Many of the German U-boats that 
normally would have threatened them had already been destroyed 
by the Allies and those that still survived would not dare attack 
such a large ship. Regardless, the captain was going to make the 
run as fast as possible as this would also decrease the likelihood of 
attack and would not stop for any men who fell overboard. The 
ship would not be stopping for anything, so everyone that wanted 
to return to the US had best stay on the ship. For the entire trip, the 
men got nervous whenever the ship hit a wave, fearing that they 
would be thrown overboard and abandoned in the ocean.  
 Eventually, the ship made it back to the United States, with 
all of the men it had left Italy with, and everyone quickly 
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disembarked. Bradley and the others were again loaded onto trains 
and taken to various camps to be processed. Bradley ended up at 
Fort Meade in Maryland where he was interviewed again, this time 
by Americans, and then given a furlough to visit home. He took the 
train into DC and got off at his usual stop. Walking down New 
York Avenue to his boyhood home, Bradley felt isolated from all 
of the people he passed. None of these people had watched people 
get blown apart by both Allied and Axis bombs in Europe. They 
would never know the joy of winning the meat lottery and finding 
that one scrap of meat at the bottom of their stew in the middle of 
Germany. And, Bradley was fairly certain, none of these people 
had ever been threatened with a machine gun for not drinking a 
vodka and gasoline cocktail. In short, none of these people had his 
war experiences, and although he could spend the rest of his life 
trying to explain it to them, they would never truly understand 
what he had gone through.72 Nothing could accurately convey all 
of his experiences to these strangers and no matter how hard he 
tried, a gap would always exist between him and civilians. For the 
rest of his life, Bradley tried to bridge this gap by talking and 
writing about his experiences. He published multiple books filled 
with his writings and poems through which he tried to convey all 
that he had seen, heard, smelled, touched and tasted. Short of 
bringing people back in time with him, this was the closest that 
Bradley could get people to what he experienced and Bradley was 
determined to share all that he knew.73  
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From Crusaders to Flunkies: American 
Newspaper Coverage of Black First World 
War Veterans in American Newspapers 
between 1915 and 1930  
By  
Matthew LaRoche 
~ ♦ ~ 
 
“War is teaching us that we are inseparably linked together 
here in America,” said Dr. Robert Moton of the Tuskegee Institute, 
in 1918. “The test of our greatness as a nation is not in the 
accumulation of wealth, nor in the development of a culture 
merely. The great test is for the fortunate to reach down and help 
the less highly favored, the poor, the humble—yes, the black. My 
race… simply asks an equal chance on equal terms with other 
Americans.”1 Black Americans met that test admirably. They bled 
in opposition to aggressive nations on the Western Front. 
However, after American newspapers released a slew of 
encouraging pieces—patriotic war propaganda aimed at 
convincing black Americans to bleed for President Wilson’s great 
democratic crusade—the nation and the news quickly forgot the 
inherent promise in letting black soldiers serve: service must equal 
citizenship in all its forms. However, with the war won, 
newspapers no longer championed the capability of and dues due 
to all black Americans. Less than a decade after the United States 
entered the First World War, the nation returned to a comfortable 
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racial status quo that saw blacks as fit to serve, but not to stand 
shoulder to shoulder with their white comrades in matters of 
respect, remembrance, and remuneration. The great, resurrected 
hope in a worldwide democracy, led by an America that proudly 
brandished equality on the home front as her sacred sword, was 
betrayed with silence.  
As Nina Mjagkij chronicles in Loyalty in Times of Trial: 
The African-American Experience During World War One, 
throughout the mobilization of the United States leading up to 
1917, the black community largely held three distinct views of 
their place in the World War. One faction, headed by W. E. B. Du 
Bois and others, including Robert Moton, imagined that the 
selfless sacrifice of black lives at the front would force a crisis of 
conscience across America, that at long last, whites would extend 
the blessings of liberty to their black countrymen.2 The second 
group, disillusioned after decades of Jim Crowe despotism, saw 
little of benefit in Wilson’s hypocritical proclamations of a war to 
defend and spread democracy worldwide.3 Put simply, if 
Wilsonian democracy abroad looked the same as democracy at 
home, nothing substantial would be gained by their deaths.  
However, the third and perhaps largest group neither dared to 
hope, nor outright condemned the war—they could only eye 
developments warily from the sidelines.4 Even with the advent of 
the universal draft for eligible males in May of 1917, supporters of 
black involvement in the war had to quickly undo centuries of bad 
blood between black Americans and the reality of America as they 
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had suffered it.5 In order to call them to the colors, encouragement 
of all kinds appeared in the public sphere. Perhaps the most widely 
distributed and noticed encouragements appeared in American 
newspapers and, largely speaking, in specifically black 
publications.   
 Between 1915 and mid-1919, newspaper representations of 
black soldiers, their accomplishments and those of their 
predecessors are fairly positive.6 For example, in August of 1915 
the Cleveland Gazette, a black newspaper from Ohio, ran the story 
of two colored sailors in the war of 1812. John Thompson lost his 
legs—and his life—aboard a privateer, allegedly shouting “Fire 
away, boys! Nebber haul de colors down!”7 as he passed. Aboard 
the same warship, John Davis “begged that he might be thrown 
overboard immediately, lest his mangled remains encumber the 
working of the guns.”8 An Ohio newspaper choosing to resurrect 
the story of a few long dead black sailors does seem somewhat out 
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of place, and perhaps even facetious. However, the article speaks 
with the utmost respect throughout, suggesting that it numbered 
among the first publications of an entirely new strain of black 
journalism, one set on resurrecting the will of black men to fight 
by extolling the successes of their ancestors.  
However, the anti-war faction within the black press 
countered these encouragements by dramatically covering the 
ways in which the military actively used its black servicemen as 
fodder. For example, the Topeka Plaindealer, another black paper, 
bristled in reaction to the fighting on the Mexican border in June of 
1916. The headline left little room for ambiguity: “In Mexico the 
Colored Boys are Chucked in Front of Enemy Bullets so that Some 
White Might Gain the Honor and Obtain Promotion!”9 Others in 
the newspaper business condemned the military less vehemently. 
This third faction utilized language that acknowledged the 
injustices suffered by black troops, but still clearly aspired to full 
respect and citizenship. A day after the Plaindealer covered the 
fighting in Mexico, another black paper, the Freeman, asked that 
“colored Americans hold memorial meetings in honor of the 
colored cavalrymen who were sacrificed in Mexico and died 
bravely fighting for the flag, which does not protect them at 
home.”10 The Freeman did not present the abuses on the southern 
border as symptomatic of an unassailable racial divide—as 
injustices that would have no solution except for, presumably, 
separation from the United States, and a total rejection of its 
hypocritical claims to liberty and equality. Rather, the Freeman 
made an intentional effort to utilize the language of patriotism as a 
means of shaming the military for not upholding the very standards 
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of liberty and equality it claimed to protect. They sought to correct 
the injustice by drawing wide attention to its inherent 
contradictions. Whether any of these efforts were particularly 
successful is unclear. But they do suggest that a lively skepticism 
posed a real challenge to the pro-war sections of the black press.  
 Still, pro-war media had other strategies for countering this 
skepticism. For one, they ran hopeful op-eds that promised black 
contributions to the allied war effort would be acknowledged and 
rewarded by war’s end. Their first cause for optimism came with 
the widespread use of colonial troops in the French and British 
armies. The Western Outlook, a black press out of Oakland, 
California, ran a piece in 1915 assuring its readers that, 
“employment of colored soldiers upon the continent of Europe 
deals a shattering blow to race prejudice. After the war is over, the 
position of the dark people in the political economy in Greater 
Britain and Greater France will never be the same as it was before 
the conflict.”11 However, this inducement came with a massive 
drawback—it would only be proven right or wrong at war’s end. 
More persuasive were the incentives that offered immediate 
payoffs, so pro-war publications naturally stressed these as much 
as possible.  
For example, the Savannah Tribune, another black paper, 
published the letter of a “Satisfied Colored Soldier” in February of 
1918, advertising service as a path to good food and travel.12 
Drawing upon a letter that Private Henry Perry’s mother had just 
received, the Tribune described army life in beyond idyllic terms. 
It brought “news that her son is doing splendid… enjoying life and 
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getting good pay for his services,” to the tune of sending home 
twenty-five dollars a month.13 Indeed, Perry wrote that the army, 
“give[s] me everything I need. We get plenty to eat. Get up every 
morning at 5:30 and go to bet [sic] at 9. This is healthy and I like 
it.”14 And if the lifestyle and paying work failed to entice black 
men to enlist, the Tribune added comments that applied social 
pressure to their young black male readers. They seized upon 
Perry’s passing comment that he felt fortunate to work alongside 
“lots of colored boys and men.”15 The Tribune turned this personal 
opinion into a subtle shaming device, writing that letters like 
Perry’s had already “caused many others at home to enlist.”16 But 
perhaps this article’s most surreptitious tactic was its attempt to 
convince readers that Perry’s experiences were that of a standard, 
black Doughboy. By giving no details as to the work Perry found 
himself doing, the Tribune deemphasized the fact that Perry was a 
member of “Stevedore Regiment 303, at Newport News, VA,” and 
as such was relegated to dock work.17 A casual reader might be 
drawn in by the reports of travel, pay, and camaraderie, might skip 
past the word “stevedore,” and forget the indignity of being 
consigned to manual labor until he had already signed enlistment 
papers. 
By mid-1917, with the U.S. finally in the war, it was too 
late for many black men to debate the pros and cons of service. By 
May 18th, the Selective Service Act had been passed, and hundreds 
of thousands of African-Americans dutifully registered for the 
                                                          
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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draft.18 They suffered overt discrimination from military 
authorities. Draft board officials tore off the lower left-hand corner 
of black registrant’s forms to better mark them out for segregated 
units.19 Naval policy relegated African-Americans to menial roles, 
and the Marine Corps barred them entirely.20 Worse, after the 
Houston Riot in August of 1917 saw armed black soldiers scuffling 
with aggressive, local whites, the military doubled down on its 
estimation that black soldiers were more a liability than an 
advantage.21 For the rest of the war, the majority of African-
American servicemen would work logistics and construction 
jobs—only two units, the 92nd and 93rd infantry divisions, ever saw 
combat.22  
Despite these ill omens, pro-war papers continued to 
publish and republish assurances that victory in Europe would lead 
to a proper appreciation of blacks at home. But none, perhaps, 
summed up the black community’s lingering hope as they endured 
the First World War than a Mr. William T. Fergusson of 
Washington, D.C. As a man well past the age of eligibility for the 
draft, Mr. Fergusson nonetheless wanted to be seen doing his part 
to defeat “an enemy whose success means a slavery many times 
worse than the one from which Lincoln emancipated us.”23 He 
wrote to the Washington Bee with a different approach in mind 
than most—something which the pro-war papers may not have 
                                                          
18 Chad L. Williams, Torchbearers of Democracy: African-
American Soldiers in the World War I Era, (Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), p. 53. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid., 54.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 2.  
23 “Our Country At War—Will the Colored Soldier Do His Duty?” 
Washington Bee, April 13, 1918. 
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fully anticipated, but surely welcomed. As he saw it, “We have 
given our men and our money to help the cause of democracy. 
Now, let us… enlist in that cause for which we can fight—
producing bigger crops.”24 Viewing this as a natural way for 
civilians to keep faith with their sons, fathers, and brothers 
overseas, Fergusson threw his heart into his plea. However, his 
zeal and optimism took a surprising turn as he fully embraced the 
tenets of the pro-war faction. He chides his fellow black civilians 
who have yet to find ways to support the war effort from home, 
“the rewards for being a patriotic citizen is a thousandfold greater 
than a few dollars ready cash.”25 But he rounds out his plea with a 
resounding faith that “When the war is over, and various men are 
called to the White House to be congratulated… some colored man 
will be among the number.”26 And not only will he be invited and 
recognized, but President Wilson “will say: Well done, faithful 
American. Enter thou into the joys of democracy.”27 
 Mr. Fergusson could hardly have been more wrong. While 
black soldiers served with extreme distinction, one of the first acts 
by the U.S. military in the post-war environment was to exclude 
blacks from officially partaking in the fruits of victory.28 As the 
triumphal Allies in all their diversity, “the British and their 
colonial servicemen, the Italians, the Japanese, the Portuguese, and 
others,”29 passed under the Arc de Triomphe, the American 
soldiers displayed were decidedly monochromatic 
 
                                                          
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid,. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Chad L. Williams, Torchbearers of Democracy, 299. 
29 Ibid.  
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“By the time of the victory parade, the Ninety-
second and Ninety-third divisions had been hastily 
shipped home, leaving no black combat troops in 
France. Thousands of black stevedores, pioneer 
infantrymen, and other service troops still remained 
for Pershing to include in the representative 
assemblage of American’s forces…. The 
marginalization of African American troops spoke 
volumes to how Woodrow Wilson, the War 
Department, and much of white America envisioned 
a similarly Jim Crowed historical memory of the 
war and black participation in it.”30  
 
From the first moment of the cease-fire, white Americans began 
the work of returning black soldiers to civilian life, to another strict 
racial hierarchy that would not afford them any kindness based on 
their sacrifices. They were to accept that, as a white speaker in 
New Orleans said, “you are going to be treated exactly like you 
were before the war; this is a white man’s country and we expect 
to rule it.”31 American newspapers watched the enforcement of this 
home order throughout the demobilization period of 1919, when 
outbursts of violence throughout that “Red Summer,” 
disproportionately targeted returning black veterans.32 While 
papers typically denounced the violence, few made the black 
soldier their main concern. 
This attitude is not surprising, considering that only for a 
brief period in 1918 did white newspapers take a positive interest 
                                                          
30 Ibid, 300. 
31 Arthur E Barbeau and Florette Henri, The Unknown Soldiers: 
African-American Troops in World War I, (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press), 175. 
32 Torchbearers of Democracy, 223-225. 
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in the accomplishments of black soldiers in France. For the 
majority of the war, black servicemen were functionally invisible. 
However, in May of 1918, the Grand Forks Herald cited “a 
notable instance of bravery and devotion by two soldiers of an 
American colored regiment operating in a French sector.”33 In a 
remarkable act of soldiering, Private Henry Johnson and Private 
Roberts “continued fighting after receiving wounds and despite the 
use of grenades by a superior force. They should be given credit 
for preventing, by their bravery, the capture of any of our men.”34   
The Fort Wayne News Sentinel echoed this as the “best story, so 
far, of the valor of Americans on the battlefields of France.”35 The 
Duluth News Tribune concurred, and even took this event as proof 
positive of “a spirit of democracy which knows no race nor 
color.”36 However, this enthusiasm for rallying around universal 
democracy was short-lived, both in the headlines and in the 
national sentiment. As soon as there was no more news of heroic 
deeds coming from the front, fault lines quickly reemerged 
between the white public and the returning black veteran.  
Most notably, perhaps, was the coverage given to promises 
of war risk insurance for black soldiers and their families, and to 
provide hospitals for black as well as white veterans in need of 
long-term care. In December of 1917, with the war far from 
decided, the Savannah Tribune published an article relaying 
Secretary of War Newton D. Baker’s desire to overcome the 
“many difficulties” of mobilizing blacks for war while taking “the 
                                                          
33 “Two Colored Soldiers Keep Off Hun Raid,” Grand Forks 
Herald, May 21, 1918. 
34 Ibid.  
35 “Pershing Puts Thrills in Official Communique,” Fort Wayne 
News Sentinel, May 20, 1918. 
36 “Lufbery’s Death is Announced in Communique,” Duluth News 
Tribune, May 21, 1918. 
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peculiar southern situation,” namely the explosive bigotry 
unleashed whenever southern whites encountered blacks in 
uniform, into account.”37 Reporting, in full, an official statement 
by the Secretary of War, they distributed proof of his promise that 
at war’s end, “all will be alike entitled to the gratitude of their 
country”—or, as the paper put it, that the “Negro Must Get [a] 
Square Deal.”38  In March of 1918, the Tribune announced that the 
Secretary of War had unveiled legislation “provided by the 
Government for the protection of the soldier and his family, in 
addition to the soldier’s monthly allotment and in addition to the 
Government’s compensation for the soldier’s death or disability.”39 
Such insurance was surely badly needed after the war had claimed 
or crippled many black soldiers, leaving many veterans and 
families short on income.  
However, regardless of Baker’s attempts to remunerate 
black war veterans as he would white veterans, by 1920 the 
Savannah Tribune had declared him guilty of blatantly 
discriminating against the future black servicemen of the post-war 
army. Citing military policy  
 
“to assign national guard units recruited from 
colored men to duty that will not incorporate them 
in a division composed of white organizations…. it 
has been decided that colored troops… shall be 
organized into pioneer infantry units that can be 
                                                          
37 “Says All Soldiers Treated Fairly,” Savannah Tribune, 
December 8, 1917. 
38 Ibid. 
39 “Secretary of War: Negro Soldiers to Insure,” Savannah 
Tribune, March 16, 1918. 
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assigned to duty under command of corps 
headquarters.”40  
He cites “considerations bearing upon military efficiency”41 as the 
sole reason behind relegating all black servicemen to labor 
battalions in the future. However, as the Tribune notes, the absence 
of any other minorities from exclusive service in the “drudgery 
corps” makes it clear that any lack of efficiency surrounding black 
troops, in light of their established competence in combat, must 
come from white discrimination.42 Baker seemed unwilling to 
rescind his position on the issue, considering it born of solid, 
“dispassionate thought.”43 
Even more blatantly biased policy neglected the needs of 
black victims of shell-shock, gas, and other lingering wounds. The 
Washington Bee reported in 1921 on the decision by the Alabama 
Chamber of Commerce to stonewall the construction of two 
hospitals in Montgomery for colored Great War veterans, “one for 
tubercular and one for shell-shocked soldiers.”44According to the 
Bee, “the board, unaware at first that the hospitals were for 
Colored Americans made every effort to secure them through 
Congressman J. R. Tyson.”45 Unsurprisingly, as soon as “Tyson 
informed the board that the two hospitals were for Colored 
soldiers,” the board “emphatically and unanimously rejected the 
idea.”46 Blistering at the injustice of the decision, the Bee protested 
                                                          
40 “Secretary of War Taken to Task,” Savannah Tribune, August 
14, 1920. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid.  
44 ”Oppose Erection of Hospital for Colored American World War 
Heroes,” Washington Bee, July 9, 1921. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
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the horror that black soldiers were left “alive but in such a 
condition that they are not able to take advantage of the 
opportunities in life. They must now take as their reward such 
conditions that are now facing them.”47 Sadly, except for 
independent philanthropy, there were few ways to overcome such 
vindictive obstacles placed before the black veteran. 
Similarly, dissenting media as a whole seemingly found it 
difficult to shout above the comfortable silence that the nation 
wrapped itself in. It seems that black soldiers had become a 
liability—a nuisance, even—as their existence clashed with the 
national desire for a “Jim Crowed” memory, as Chad L. Williams 
recounts.48 After 1920, even the Savannah Tribune focuses almost 
solely on the economic effects of the war on black workers, not 
soldiers, with the exception of a 1921 article on, again, Captain 
Needham Roberts, “one of the two Negro soldiers of the New York 
15th who had the distinction of being the first American soldiers to 
be decorated in France.”49 By 1927, only one rather unsettling 
article on black soldiers, from the Topeka Plaindealer, appears, 
one that encapsulates how little had come of black hopes in the 
Great War. 
Whether or not the posting was strictly racially motivated 
or not, the condition of the 10th U.S. Cavalry Regiment (Colored) 
as of August 1927 offers a further poignant visage of the black 
soldier, so successful in war, losing the peace and returning to his 
“proper” place in American society. A decade after the U.S.’s 
                                                          
47 Ibid. 
48 Torchbearers of Democracy, p. 300. 
49 “Great Negro Hero of World War,” Savannah Tribune, August 
4, 1921. The other two articles from 1921 on that pertain to the war 
at all are “The Coming of War Meant New Day for Negro Labor,” 
Feb. 5, 1921 and “Negro Workers During the World War,” March 
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entry into the First World War, as “Uncle Sam’s only cavalry 
division” marched out of Ft. Bliss, E Troop of the “famous 10th 
Cavalry Colored” regiment left Ft. Huachua to escort them en 
route.”50 By “escort” the Army meant “look after [dignitaries and 
military officials], care for their horses, etc.” After yet again 
answering the call of their country—and, indeed, of the budding 
Free World—colored soldiers of the United States were still 
singled out for use as “flunkies,” as manservants and horse 
handlers.51 Serving in segregated units, and serving as literal 
servants was customary long after the sacrifices of the Argonne 
Forest, to say nothing of Yorktown, New Orleans, or Ft. Wagner.  
American newspapers apparently saw nothing to criticize in 
that; the headlines stayed silent on the matter, even amongst black 
newspapers. By 1927, the black soldier had again been reduced to 
a caricature, something that could be “famous” while still 
consigned to holding horses for white superiors, be they officers or 
rank-and-file soldiers.52 While the war was afoot, this caricature 
was arguably manipulated and romanticized for propaganda 
purposes, as with the tale of privates Johnson and Roberts. Those 
taken in by the image of a son of slaves liberating the downtrodden 
of France and Belgium seemingly ignored the hypocrisy of 
returning such a man to Jim Crow and further decades of socially 
abided racial violence. With the peace, the names of colored 
soldiers on monuments across France were left to molder on the 
edge of national memory, sustained by fewer and fewer voices 
with each passing year. Even the tradition of dissent set forth by a 
core of black newspapers could not sustain the outcry for 
                                                          
50 “Colored Troop Attend Cavalry Division Maneuvers—As 
Flunkies,” Topeka Plaindealer, August 30, 1927. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid.  
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recognition. The promise of citizenship, although written with 
blood, was thought certain to invigorate the black “menace of 
degeneracy” in countless imagined forms.53 For most, the 
uncertainty of equality was too dangerous for interwar America to 
deliver—so America did not deliver. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
53 Nina Mjagkij, Loyalty in Times of Trial, p. 176.  
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Introduction 
 
From the earliest contact between Europeans and 
Indigenous Americans, traces of cultural conversion and coercion 
underpinned the emerging interactions. These cultural pressures 
often materialized through religion, chiefly Christianity. As the 
“white man’s burden” of bringing what they considered 
civilization to the newfound lands pervaded the public conscience, 
spreaders of the gospel permeated Indigenous American 
communities. A special relationship between Christian 
missionaries and Native peoples developed, often serving as the 
first and sometimes only forms of interracial interaction. 
 Following their revolutionary victory, America’s first wave 
of officials had a challenge to confront: how to handle the Native 
tribes within and around American-claimed lands. The initial 
conquered lands approach soon gave way to Secretary of War 
Henry Knox’s civilization program. This directive, begun during 
George Washington’s presidency, established Native tribes as 
sovereign nations while simultaneously working towards their 
eventual assimilation into the dominant American culture. Knox 
and Washington, like most leaders of their day, viewed the Natives 
as uncivilized, which meant living and functioning under non-
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Euro-American standards and mores. As these officials depicted 
the Indigenous inferiority as cultural instead of racial, they pursued 
a process through which the Native people would gain the 
intellectual, moral, and physical tools required for their 
acculturation. The early American government quickly endorsed 
Christianization as integral to this acculturation process.1 
 As missionaries sought out distant lands to transform tribal 
peoples, the U.S. experienced a transformation of its own in the 
Second Great Awakening of the early nineteenth century. This 
religious revolution formed a new frontier of American 
Christianity. Doctrines of self-improvement and revivalist 
reformation replaced stricter Calvinistic teachings of preordination. 
New forms of socio-religious egalitarianism undermined past 
religious hierarchies, especially in New England parishes only 
recently adjusted to the effects of the First Great Awakening of the 
mid-eighteenth century. These undercurrents sent shockwaves 
through the American populace and catalyzed a number of reform 
efforts. The combination of democratic egalitarianism and zealous 
self-improvement energized an individualistic approach that 
focused on changing society one person at a time, viewing the 
body politic as an atomized collective only alterable from the atom 
up.2 
 The Second Great Awakening had perhaps its greatest 
effect on religious institutions and efforts themselves. These 
effects extended beyond pulpits and congregations to missionary 
causes. Sometimes already structurally in place due to previous 
outreach and the federal government’s civilization program, the 
                                                          
1 Theda Perdue, “Introduction: The Cherokees and U.S. Indian Policy,” The 
Cherokee Removal: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. 
Martin’s, 2016), 7-11. 
2 For more information on the reform movements stemming from the Second 
Great Awakening, see John Thomas, “Romantic Reform in America, 1815-
1865,” American Quarterly, Vol. 17, Issue 4 (Winter, 1965): 656-681. 
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Second Great Awakening’s religious revivalism revitalized the 
missionary cause. A new generation of preachers swelled the 
missionary ranks and descended upon tribal peoples, bringing their 
gospel fervor to the “heathen” lands. As the atomized conceptions 
of self- and societal reform combined with the doctrine of 
Millenialism, which demanded faith across all people to usher in 
the holy millennium prophesied in scripture, many believers turned 
to the Indigenous Americans to prove their worth, craft a better 
society, and swell the ranks of the devout.3 
 While all missionaries provide a profound insight into early 
American perceptions of their Native neighbors, the missionaries 
to the Cherokees prove remarkable and worthy of special attention 
for a variety of reasons. These missionaries came from diverse 
backgrounds and held diverse beliefs. Some followed 
Congregationalist doctrines; others Methodist, Baptist, or 
Moravian. Many came from New England; others Tennessee, 
North Carolina, or elsewhere. By the time of removal, 
Congregationalists had established nine mission stations in the 
Tennessee, Alabama, and Georgia regions of the Cherokee Nation 
and sent thirty-five ministers, school teachers, and artisans to these 
outposts; the Moravians boasted two mission stations in Cherokee 
Georgia; the Methodists had eight circuit-riding missionaries; and 
                                                          
3 For more about the causes and propagation of the Second Great Awakening, 
see Donald G. Mathews, “The Second Great Awakening as an Organizing 
Process, 1780-1830: An Hypothesis,” American Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 1 
(Spring, 1969): 23-43. For more on the effects of the Second Great Awakening, 
see Louis P. Masur, “Religion and Politics,” 1831: Year of Eclipse (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 2001), 63-114; and Richard D. Shiels, “The Scope of the Second 
Great Awakening: Andover, Massachusetts, as a Case Study,” Journal of the 
Early Republic, Vol. 5, No. 2, Religion in the Early Republic (Summer, 1985): 
223-246. To see how missionary-like effects affected other portions of the 
United States during the Second Great Awakening, turn to Carol Sherif, “The 
Perils of Progress,” The Artificial River: The Erie Canal and the Paradox of 
Progress, 1817-1862 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), 138-171. 
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the Baptists had sent a total of nine missionaries, teachers, and 
artisans.4 
The fact that they worked with and lived among the 
Cherokees gives them a prominent position within the history of 
American-Indian affairs. The Cherokees held a special place in the 
minds of white Americans. They had long attempted to adopt the 
norms of white society and, subsequently, gained the moniker the 
“most civilized tribe” in America. The missionaries’ arrival in the 
1810s, 20s, and 30s occurred during a pivotal era for the Cherokee 
Nation. Always attempting to halt the approach of the white man 
onto their lands, the Cherokees faced a crisis in the 1820s and 30s 
when Georgia and, beginning in 1829, the federal government 
demanded they relinquish their homelands to the state and 
encroaching settlers. The missionaries continued to live among the 
Cherokees throughout this period, and, consequently, through 
extant letters, diaries, and journals, they provide a crucial source of 
information for decoding the complex conceptions surrounding the 
Cherokees and Native Americans that pervaded the white psyche 
in the Early Republic. An examination of such documents 
complicates traditional, bifurcated understandings of helper and 
harmer in relation to Native Americans. 
 
Civilized vs Savage 
 
Before deciphering the missionaries’ conceptions, one must first 
define and decode the language they employed in their discussions 
of the Cherokees. When Revered Cyrus Kingsbury marched from 
Boston to what is now Chattanooga, Tennessee, in January 1817, 
to establish the Brainerd School on behalf of the American Board 
                                                          
4 William G. McLoughlin, The Cherokees and Christianity, 1794-1870: Essays 
on Acculturation and Cultural Persistence, Ed. Walter H. Conser, Jr. (Athens, 
GA: The University of Georgia Press), 60-61. 
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of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) – the 
Congregationalist missionary organization – he framed his 
impending work in the same binary context of civilization and 
wilderness, civilized and savage, that white Americans had applied 
to Indigenous Americans for centuries. On March 4, 1817, 
Kingsbury noted the enthusiasm among the missionaries over “the 
great and good work of building the cause of the Redeemer in this 
Heathen land.” Two days later, Kingsbury penned, “Here for the 
first time I beheld the dear sisters who are devoted to the arduous 
work of civilizing and converting the savages of our wilderness.”5 
In January 1818, Ard Hoyt, another ABCFM missionary, 
commented, “It is truly painful to see the ignorance of these 
people…in several instances when first speaking with them on the 
most solemn and momentous subjects, they would laugh like 
[mere?] idiots.”6 As displayed by Kingsbury’s and Hoyt’s entries, 
missionaries, and others, constantly incorporated words such as 
heathen, savage, ignorant, and wilderness (or wild) in discussions 
of Native Americans. The strikethrough of “like [mere?] idiots” 
suggests that Hoyt may have reconsidered the original inclusion of 
such condescension, but its original insertion says more than his 
change of mind.  
Other words and phrases, such as darkness, similarly coated 
their language. When facing the loss of Catharine Brown, a student 
whose model example would gain her fame and turn her memory 
into a partially fictionalized figure, because of her family’s western 
emigration, Ard Hoyt lamented, “Precious babe in Christ! a few 
months ago brought out of the dark wilderness; here illuminated by 
the word & spirit of God, & now to be sent back to the dark & 
                                                          
5 Cyrus Kingsbury, March 4 and March 6, 1817, entries in The Brainerd 
Journal: A Mission to the Cherokees, 1817-1823, eds. Joyce B. Phillips and Paul 
Gary Phillips (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1998): 31. 
6 Ard Hoyt, Jan. 28, 1818, entry in ibid., 45. 
~ 113 ~ 
 
chilling shades of the forest.”7 The constructed dichotomies 
became almost Biblical: a confrontation between light and dark. 
 This cultural lexicon functioned as much more than a 
conglomeration of abstractions; concrete notions grounded words 
such as heathen, savage, civilization, ignorant, and darkness in 
clearly defined ways. A host of long-standing standards combined 
to make a person or a people civilized or savage, and, in order to 
understand the missionaries’ perceptions of Native Americans, we 
must first understand these concrete qualifications. 
 One of the first requirements for “civilization” was a 
Lockean approach to economic living. As Roy Harvey Pearce 
explained in his work Savagism and Civilization: 
 
This is agrarian idealism, the belief that men, 
having a natural right to their land by occupation 
and labor, achieve status and dignity by exercising 
that right and becoming freeholding farmers…. For 
Locke—and virtually all Americans were, in the 
most general sense, Lockeans—man achieved his 
highest humanity by taking something out of nature 
and converting it with his labor into part of himself. 
His private property, conceived of in terms of the 
close, personal relationships of an agrarian society, 
was his means to social maturity.”8 
 
Thomas Jefferson echoed this ideology in his Notes on the State of 
Virginia: “Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of 
                                                          
7 Hoyt, Nov. 20, 1818, entry in ibid., 94. Catharine Brown would become a 
popular figure through her published memoir – published with the assistance of 
a missionary helper – and then dramatized in a play about her titled Catharine 
Brown, the Converted Cherokee. 
8 Pearce, Savagism and Civilization, 67-68. 
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God, if ever He had a chosen people. Whose breasts he has made 
his particular deposit for substantial and genuine virtue.”9 When 
whites first encountered Native Americans, the indigenous peoples 
had no conception of land ownership or the linear territoriality that 
caused Europeans to divvy up and fence off land. Over time, 
American Indians developed a sense of land ownership, but it 
functioned as a communal commodity for the public good as 
opposed to a privatized parcel. Most Europeans and then 
Americans – and, therefore, the missionaries – viewed these clear 
set private boundaries as requirements for civilization, leading to 
what Jeremiah Evarts terms the “controversies about 
unappropriated lands,” or the discussions during the Early 
Republic over whether Indigenous Americans had a rightful claim 
to lands they did not separate and cultivate or whether state 
governments controlled such lands.10 
                                                          
9 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Memorial Edition, II, 229, as 
quoted in Roy Harvey Pearce, Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian 
and the American Mind (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of 
California Press, 1988), 67. This economic system espoused by Jefferson would 
come to be known as the “yeoman republic,” and, albeit meaning different 
things to different people, would come to dominate a large swath of the 
American public as Jeffersonians took power after the election of 1800. 
Contemporaneous to missionaries visiting the Cherokees and Georgia asserting 
its claims over Cherokee lands, Jeffersonian political economy had a resurgent 
reverberation throughout America through the ascendancy of its second great 
champion: Andrew Jackson. Jackson’s stance on political economy would, of 
course, influence his eventual stance on Indigenous Americans, which would 
have profound consequences for the Cherokees. For more on Jeffersonian 
political economy, see Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political 
Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1980). 
10 Anna Rosina, The Moravian Springplace Mission to the Cherokee, eds. Anna 
Rosina Gambold, John Gambold, and Rowena McClinton. Abridged ed. 
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2010): 65; Jeremiah Evarts, “No. 
XVII,” The “William Penn” Essays and Other Writings, ed. Francis Paul Prucha 
(Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1981): 134.  
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 This cultivation requirement and agrarian ideal caused 
agriculture to take precedence in American conceptions of 
civilization. Since Americans almost universally viewed their 
native neighbors as savages, they also largely believed Native 
Americans subsisted off of the “hunt,” despite apparent 
agricultural tendencies within all eastern American Indians.11 
These misconceptions led white Americans to endorse the 
proliferation of agricultural practices among the tribes. This effort 
manifested in the 1791 Treaty of Hopewell between the federal 
government and the Cherokees, stating, “That the Cherokee nation 
may be led to a greater degree of civilization, and to become 
herdsmen and cultivators, instead of remaining in a state of 
hunters, the United States will, from time to time, furnish 
gratuitously the said nation with useful implements of 
husbandry.”12 Missionaries followed this example when among the 
Cherokees. At Springplace Mission, a mission nestled into the 
Appalachian Mountains along the border of Tennessee and 
Georgia, the Moravians set up orderly orchards to teach Cherokees 
agricultural methods.13 The missionaries at Brainerd displayed a 
constant anxiety over what they considered the hunter state of the 
supposedly ignorant Cherokees and did all they could to eradicate 
                                                          
11 Pearce argues that the idea of Native Americans as uncivilized penetrated so 
deep into the American conscience that it effectively blindfolded them to 
information which would refute their perceptions, creating a system of cultural 
cognitive bias that perpetuated the Native mythology: “Universally Americans 
could see the Indian only as hunter. That his culture…was as much agrarian as 
hunting, they simply could not see. They forgot too, if they had ever known, that 
many of their own farming methods had been taken over directly from the 
Indians whom they were pushing westward. One can say only that their 
intellectual and cultural traditions, their idea of order, so informed their thoughts 
and their actions that they could see and conceive of nothing but the Indian who 
hunted.” Pearce, Savagism and Civilization, 66. 
12 Quoted in Perdue, “Introduction,” The Cherokee Removal, 11. The Treaty of 
Hopewell comprised one portion of the civilization program. 
13 Rosina, The Moravian Springplace, 2, 74. 
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this perceived way of life. When first establishing the Brainerd 
school, Reverend Kingsbury explained his hopes that “we may be 
instrumental of putting them in a way to obtain an abundance of 
bread, & all other necessaries of life, by teaching them & their 
children to cultivate the earth.”14 Over a year later, when a twenty-
four-year-old Cherokee applied to live at their school, the Brainerd 
missionaries marked his “rambling li[f]e” and how he “obtained 
his living by hunting.” They went on to tell him “hunting could not 
be permitted, but we would put him in a better way to purchase 
clothes, viz., that we would employ him to labor with our men in 
the field a sufficient time to buy his necessary clothing.”15 This 
value system of agricultural labor caused the characterization of 
“industrious” to become one of the most highly regarded traits 
among the students. 
 Connected to the view of the hunter state came an 
evaluation of backwards gender dynamics among the Cherokees. 
In the traditional Cherokee way of life, men typically hunted while 
women farmed. The rigidity of these gender roles broke down 
slightly when men assisted with clearing fields and planting crops 
and women dressed and tanned deerskins, but generally these 
separated roles defined Cherokee gender dynamics. At the same 
time, the Cherokees lived under matrilineal and matricentric 
societal and cultural structures, a dichotomous opposition to the 
patriarchal Euro-American society.16 Since white Americans and 
Christian missionaries presumed the inferiority of the hunter state 
and associated masculinity with agricultural manual labor, public 
                                                          
14 Kingsbury, May 1, 1817, entry in The Brainerd Journal, 34. 
15 Hoyt, June 2, 1818, entry in ibid, 61-62. 
16 Perdue, “Introduction,” The Cherokee Removal, 2; M. Amanda Moulder, 
“Missionary Intentions: Literacy Learning Among Early Nineteenth-Century 
Cherokee Women,” College Composition and Communication, Vol. 63, No. 1, 
Indigenous and Ethnic Rhetorics (Sept., 2011): 76-77. 
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leadership, and the head of house, a clear effort was made to 
redefine Cherokee gender roles. 
As Barbara Welter lays out in her essay “The Cult of True 
Womanhood,” America experienced a firm tightening of gender 
roles at the same time as missionaries ventured to Cherokee land. 
These evolving gender roles created two distinct spheres for men 
and women: men would operate in the public sphere, working and 
bringing home the means to survive, while women would operate 
within the private sphere of the home, cultivating a domain of 
comfort for her wearied husband.17 These sentiments rang true for 
the missionaries, displayed by Hoyt’s assertion that “our dear 
sisters at the north would gladly take part with their sisters here in 
the labor of making clothes for these naked sons of the forest.”18 
The acculturation of these emerging, or tightening, gender 
dynamics would force Cherokee women into the home and 
Cherokee men into the fields. To accomplish this, missionaries 
taught women how to cook, spin, weave, sew, and mend, as well as 
make butter, cheese, soap, and candles, while they taught men how 
to prepare lands and plant and harvest crops. William G. 
McLoughlin summed up this effort in his essay “Two Bostonian 
Missionaries”: “The Board [ABCFM] used the mission farm to 
teach young Indian boys how to become farmers; missionary wives 
educated young Cherokees girls to become farmers’ wives.”19 The 
missionary drive to separate boys and girls in order to demarcate 
their separately defined roles caused the Brainerd missionaries to 
flirt with the idea of establishing a separate school for girl pupils, 
                                                          
17 Barbara Welter, “The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860,” American 
Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, Part 1 (Summer, 1966): 151-174. 
18 Hoyt, June 19, 1818, entry in The Brainerd Journal, 65. Neither Hoyt nor any 
other missionary appears to have reasoned that any men could contribute to this 
clothes-making labor. 
19 McLoughlin, The Cherokees and Christianity, 63. 
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with male missionaries teaching the boys and female missionaries 
the girls.20 
 The attempted application of patriarchal gender roles 
extended into missionary efforts to reform Cherokee marriage 
practices. Cherokee marriage practices had long included 
polygamy, specifically sororal or intra-familial polygamy where a 
man would marry a set of sisters. No laws bound husbands to their 
wives, so when a husband grew upset with his wife he would 
sometimes simply leave the household and live with his relatives 
until he married again and moved in with his new wife, still 
technically married to his previous one(s).21 This practice often 
shocked missionaries. When Anna Rosina of the Moravian 
Springplace mission encountered John Rogers, a Cherokee, she 
noted “Mr. Rogers’s two women, namely a mother and her 
daughter! [author’s emphasis].”22 This small notation conveys 
both the utter surprise, and judgment, in regards to Mr. Rogers’s 
union with both a woman and her daughter and the missionaries’ 
perceptions of marriage as a form of property ownership – “Mr. 
Rogers’s two women.” Missionaries worked hard to explain the 
flaws and sin of polygamy and to institute the “correct” form of 
marriage within the Cherokee nation. When one polygamous 
relationship led to complications with one Cherokee man’s 
                                                          
20 One missionary, a Father Gambold, “who has resided as a teacher, more than 
12 years in the nation,” went so far as to say they “shall find it quite necessary to 
keep the sexes more separate. Being himself unable to have more than one 
school, he has, after repeated experiments of both sexes together, excluded the 
females entirely.” Hoyt, July 3, 1818, entry in The Brainerd Journal, 69. This 
prioritization of male learning over female learning reflects Welter’s 
conclusions regarding women’s education in this time period. For more 
information on this, see Barbara Welter, “The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-
1860,” American Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, Part 1 (Summer, 1966): 166-168. 
21 Joyce B. Phillips and Paul Gary Phillips, Note 89 in “Notes for 1818,” The 
Brainerd Journal, 465. 
22Rosina, Moravian Springplace, 80. 
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children’s enrollment at the Brainerd school, Hoyt wrote, “How 
much better for this man & his children if he had adhered to the 
original institutions of marriage; few, however, of the natives pay 
attention to it.”23 The missionaries work to propagate their 
“original institutions of marriage” and ensure such complications 
would not happen again. 
 Similar to the social institution of marriage, Americans also 
attempted to enforce white governmental institutions on the 
Cherokees, believing these the best means to attain and maintain 
civilization. Cherokee society had long functioned under the 
structures of clan and kinship. Seven clans banded together to 
make the Cherokee nation, and blood ties rooted in shared ancestry 
held the clans together.24 A combination of clan ties and adherence 
to a faith in cosmic harmony created an effective societal structure 
of clan governance. As Theda Perdue outlines in her introduction 
to The Cherokee Removal, “The obligation of clan members were 
[sic] so strong and so scrupulously fulfilled that the Cherokees had 
no need for a police force or court system: Protection, restitution, 
and retribution came from the clan.”25 Many Americans, including 
the missionaries, mistook the clan forms of governance and blood 
retaliation as anarchy and barbarism, and thus pressure caused the 
National Council to outlaw blood retaliation in favor of the Nation 
to resolve future injuries and disputes through legal meams.26 This 
same process caused an increasing centralization of power and, 
subsequently, more rigid social hierarchy within the Nation. Over 
time, the National Council, developing into an elite body made up 
of wealthy, English-literate, Christian Cherokees of partial white 
ancestry, instituted a number of laws that dissuaded polygamy, 
                                                          
23 Hoyt, Sept. 5, 1818, entry in The Brainerd Journal, 82. 
24 Gambold, Gambold, and McClinton, The Moravian Springplace, 88-89. 
25 Perdue, “Introduction,” The Cherokee Removal, 4. 
26 Gambold, Gambold, and McClinton, Moravian Springplace, 89. 
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transitioned away from the matrilineal genealogy, and generally 
promoted a restructuring of the broader social order. These 
pressures eventually compelled the National Council to adopt a 
constitution in 1827 modelled on the American republican system, 
replete with a bicameral legislature and judicial system.27 
 
Christianity 
 
Americans and, perhaps even more so, missionaries combined 
Christianity and civilization; civilizing and converting went hand 
in hand. As displayed in the Kingsbury quote above, Kingsbury 
places the “arduous work of civilizing and converting the savages 
of our wilderness” in the same train of thought.28 The fervor of the 
Second Great Awakening and its resulting Millenialism and 
revivalism caused an even greater emphasis on conversion among 
Native Americans in the early nineteenth century. Missionaries 
disagreed as to the process of Christianization; Congregationalists 
favored a stricter, more hierarchical and local approach while 
Baptists and Methodists preferred a more itinerant, egalitarian, and 
open one. They also sometimes disagreed as to the steps within 
that process – whether Christianization directly meant civilization, 
whether civilization should precede Christianization, and vice 
versa. They did all, however, agree on one thing: the absolute 
necessity of Christianity for a civilized society. As McLoughlin 
puts it, this meant that “To Christianize was to Americanize.”29 
 Despite assertions by missionaries and other Americans, 
the Cherokees had long had religious and spiritual practices. They 
held a spiritual sense of cosmic harmony, a balance of the universe 
                                                          
27 For more on the background to the Constitution and the Constitution itself, see 
Perdue, “The Cherokee Constitution of 1827,” The Cherokee Removal, 58-70. 
28 Kingsbury, March 6, 1817, entry in The Brainerd Journal, 31. 
29 McLoughlin, The Cherokees and Christianity, 38, 63-69. 
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that held everything together. Ancestry and ancestral lands 
contained spiritual significance for the Cherokees. They also had a 
ritualistic belief system that included ceremonial events, such as 
rain dances. Beyond these views and practices, they did have some 
beliefs akin to Christian theology. One such similarity came 
through their origin story, which consisted of a deity figure 
creating life, potentially in a seven day cycle and out of clay, and 
told the story of the first man and woman and an eventual fall of 
humanity.30 
 Despite the rather clear presence of spiritual and/or 
religious beliefs and practices among the people, some 
missionaries depicted the Cherokees as completely areligious. In 
April of 1818, Hoyt wrote 
 
There is nothing among this people to oppose the 
gospel, except their ignorance & the depravity of 
the human heart. They have not, as is the case with 
most heathen nations, a system of false religion, 
handed down from their fathers, which must be 
overturned in order to make way for the Gospel. 
They are rather, as the Prophet foretold the children 
of Israel would be, ‘Without sacrifice, & without an 
image, & without an ephod, & without a 
teraphim.’31 
 
                                                          
30 For more information on the Cherokee Origin stories and missionary 
understandings of them, see Moravian Springplace, 106-110. For more 
information on rainmaking practices, see pages 84 to 86 of the same work. 
31 Hoyt, April 9, 1818, entry in The Brainerd Journal, 51-52. The use of 
“handed down from their fathers” demonstrates the patricentric mindset of the 
missionaries. As opposed to the exclusively male clergy of the missionaries, 
Cherokee women actually passed down the oral traditions that would contain the 
Cherokee spiritual or religious narratives. 
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Roughly three and a half months later, Hoyt noted a conversation 
the missionaries had with a band of visiting Cherokees in which 
the visitors expressed “they had no expectation of any thing after 
death.” Apparently, these Cherokees “seldom or never bestowed 
any thoughts on these things . . . they were not conscious of ever 
having done, said, or thought any thing that was wrong or sinful.” 
Hoyt concluded that “they appeared as stupid, ignorant & 
unconcerned as the hearts that perish ever destitute of that 
conscience which St. Paul speaks of as ‘accusing or excusing,’” 
and then goes on to say, “But it is not thus with all the Natives 
around us. Some of them are considerably enlightened, & feel the 
importance of receiving further instruction. Darkness itself cannot 
be seen without some light.”32 The final comment perhaps proves 
the most fruitful within this entry, that “considerably enlightened” 
Natives “feel the importance of receiving further instruction.” Hoyt 
clarifies that this band did not include some particularly areligious 
or unthinking Cherokees, but instead could stand in for the whole 
of the people outside of those who actively turned to the 
missionaries for enlightenment. Thus, only involvement with the 
missionaries and conversion to Christianity could break apart “the 
thick darkness that shrouds their minds.”33 
 This sentiment extends the ethnocentrism previously 
outlined to religion, and creates a belief system which places value 
on the missionaries as a saving, guiding force of light. The 
emphasis on the missionary role of illuminating the ignorant and 
darkened Cherokees has the practical effect of making missionary 
ventures directly necessary, but it also furthers the paternalistic 
approach that treated the Cherokees like children who did not 
know better. Hoyt did not paint a picture of paganist people, but 
                                                          
32 Hoyt, July 26, 1818, entry in ibid, 75-76. 
33 Ibid, 76. 
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instead took all religious/spiritual agency away from the Cherokees 
and placed it within the hands of the missionaries, who could pull 
the Cherokees from the grips of the darkness that surrounded them. 
He fails to recognize, in any manner, that their belief systems and 
abstract approaches may have little or nothing to do with an 
afterlife, and may develop in a complex way in which he never 
imagined. Instead, he characterizes these people as “stupid, 
ignorant & unconcerned,” seemingly without any conscience irony 
regarding the fact that they willingly entered into a discussion of 
his beliefs while he failed to inquire about, and therefore even 
remotely comprehend, theirs. Their lack of knowledge in regards 
to his faith gave Hoyt enough evidence to draw conclusions of 
their ignorance. 
 Not all missionaries diminished Cherokees’ agency to the 
extent or in the way that Hoyt did in this instance, and not all 
required the same strict white standards out of their converts. The 
Methodists and Baptists, already less rigid in their missionary 
structures, primarily due to their itinerancy, more openly admitted 
Cherokees among their religious ranks. Similarly, the Methodists 
and Baptists proved much more likely to ordain Natives as well as 
admit them. The ABCFM ordained a few, but their nearly 
impossibly unrealistic standards kept them from propagating a 
Cherokee class of Congregational preachers, and correspondingly 
made them rather critical of the Baptist and Methodist ordained 
Native ministers.34 
 In a parallel vein, the different denominations differed over 
usage of the Cherokee language within conversion efforts, both 
verbal and written, since Sequoyah had established the Cherokee 
syllabary in 1827. Baptist and Methodist missionaries had a much 
greater inclination to support utilization of the Cherokee language, 
                                                          
34 McLoughlin, The Cherokees and Christianity, 83-90. 
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believing, in their more egalitarian approach, it could help them 
reach a much wider audience. Some Baptist and Methodist 
ministers did their best to learn at least conversational Cherokee 
and the larger organizations set out translating the Bible into a 
written Cherokee format. Congregationalists, on the other hand, 
resisted these bilingual efforts. The ABCFM summarized the 
Congregationalist view in its first annual report when it claimed, 
“Assimilated in language, they will more readily become 
assimilated in habits and manners to their white neighbors.”35 
Samuel Worcester, the first corresponding secretary of the 
ABCFM, expressed a similar sentiment when he said using the 
Cherokee language “would perpetuate the dying Indian tongue.”36 
The Congregationalists eventually relented and submitted to the 
usage of the Cherokee language, but they always viewed this as a 
temporary measure.37 
 
Missionaries in Relation 
 
The savage mythos that surrounded Indigenous Americans 
penetrated deep into the American psyche. Indian captivity 
narratives circulated throughout early America and bloody stories 
of Native barbarity – of hatchets, scalps, and war-whoops – 
flooded the popular imagination and drowned out the voice and 
                                                          
35 Cited in McLoughlin, The Cherokees and Christianity, 68. This sentiment – 
that the tools of conversion should function within the process of acculturation – 
furthers the supposition that Christianization and civilization served the same 
purpose. 
36 Samuel Worcester to Jeremiah Evans, July 1, 1815, ABCFM Papers, as cited 
in McLoughlin, The Cherokees and Christianity, 68 
37 For a much more intricate examination of Americans’ attitudes and 
intellectual approach to Native American languages, see Sean P. Harvery, 
“‘Must Not Their Languages Be Savage and Barbarous Like Them”: Philology, 
Indian Removal, and Race Science,” Journal of the Early Republic, 30 (Winter, 
2010): 505-532. 
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presence of the actual Native Americans, as they became 
caricatures or stereotypes, more animal than human. In his letter to 
Andrew Jackson, then forwarded to Congress in February of 1832, 
Secretary of War Lewis Cass outlines some of the prevailing 
American views of the southeastern Indigenous tribes and the 
Native American peoples in general. He accuses them of a 
“predisposition to war,” of being “like children,” and of an 
“indolence and improvidence” characteristic “of the Indian race.”38 
 These assumptions of Indigenous character led Cass, and 
many others, to conclude that the “Indian race” would soon go 
extinct, especially if it maintained contact with the superior race 
and culture of the white man. This argument stemmed from an 
acceptance of the inevitability of white settlers encroaching upon 
Native lands, which would shrink their lands to a size 
unsustainable for their hunting way of life, thus ending it 
altogether. This reality proved unavoidable in the march of 
progress. In his Second Annual Message, President Jackson 
articulated this racial determinism and its inexorability 
 
Humanity has often wept over the face of the 
aborigines of this country, and Philanthropy has 
been long busily employed in devising means to 
avert it, but its progress has never for a moment 
been arrested, and one by one have many powerful 
                                                          
38 U.S. Congress, 22nd Congress, 1st Session, Removal of Indians Westward, 
Message from the President of the United States, upon the subject of the 
contemplated removal of the Indians to the west of the River Mississippi, 
February 16, 1832, Referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs, 1832, 
(H.exdoc. 116), Washington: Thomas Allen, 1832 (Serial Set 219), 7, 9, 14. 
Americans managed, seemingly without any hint of cognitive dissonance, to 
hold several somewhat contradictory views of Native Americans. The popular 
image of Native Americans cast them as both threatening and incapable, both 
powerful and powerless. 
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tribes disappeared from the earth. To follow to the 
tomb the last of his race and to tread on the graves 
of extinct nations excite melancholy reflections. But 
true philanthropy reconciles the mind to these 
vicissitudes as it does to the extinction of one 
generation to make room for another . . . What good 
man would prefer a country covered with forests 
and ranged by a few thousand savages to our 
extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and 
prosperous farms, embellished with all the 
improvements which art can devise or industry 
execute, occupied by more than 12,000,000 happy 
people, and filled with all the blessings of liberty, 
civilization, and religion?39 
 
People who held these views of Indigenous extinction often 
predicated them upon the inability of the “savage” to change and 
achieve the civilized way of life of their white neighbors. Once 
again, Lewis Cass perfectly summarizes this view: “To collect 
savage men together, who are ignorant of the very first rudiments 
of civilization, who have, in fact, neither government, law, 
religion, property, arts, nor manufactures; who are actuated by 
impulse, and not by reflection; by whom the past and the future are 
almost equally disregarded, and to teach them abstract principles, 
is a process which seems, on calm reflection, to promise as little as 
it has performed.”40 Cass depicts the missionary efforts, and all 
similar efforts to bring white civilization to the Indigenous 
                                                          
39 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, II, 
ed. J.D. Richardson, 520-521, cited in Pearce, Savagism and Civilization, 57. 
Especially note Jackson’s closing question again linking civilization and 
religion. 
40 U.S. Congress, Removal of Indians Westward, 11. 
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Americans, as vain; due to the inferiority of the race of “savages,” 
this race could never gain the implements of civilization and, as a 
result, would go extinct. 
 Some have argued that the missionaries worked among the 
Indigenous Americans throughout this era to grant salvation for 
their charges in the next life, as opposed to civilization in this one. 
Such an approach indicated a resignation, or perhaps 
acknowledgment, or this-worldly betterment in the form of 
missionary civilizing efforts. Roy Harvey Pearce followed this 
train of thought in regards to the missionaries: “Missionary 
societies proliferated; for conversion of the heathen Indian seemed 
to be the only way to save him, Christianity being the one thing 
which civilization could give him and not take away.”41 Perhaps 
this was true for some missionaries, as many expressed concern 
over the souls of Natives: on January 11, 1818, Ard Hoyt 
wondered, “And, if they are not enlightened by the Gospel, where 
will be their immortal souls?”42 Yet efforts to save Cherokee souls 
does not exclude efforts to civilize them; missionaries taught 
civilization alongside scripture, practical living alongside 
theological ideals.  
 Beyond solely enacting plans to civilize Native Americans, 
many missionaries posited that Indigenous Americans could 
change, and some expressed satisfaction over past changes and 
optimism over future prospects. Revered Thomas Roberts, a 
Baptist missionary among the Cherokees, remarked, “The 
Cherokee children learn as fast as any children I ever saw. They 
are kind, obedient, and industrious. Their mental powers appear to 
                                                          
41 Pearce, Savagism and Civilization, 61. 
42 Hoyt, Jan. 11, 1818, entry in The Brainerd Journal, 42. 
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be in no respect inferior to those of whites.”43 Jeremiah Evarts, in 
his essayistic refutation of Indian Removal, went a step further in 
his depiction of the Cherokees: 
 
the Cherokees are neither savages, nor criminals . . . 
they are peaceful agriculturists, better clothed, fed, 
and housed, than many of the peasantry, in most 
civilized countries . . . they have been encouraged 
and aided, in rising to a state of civilization, by our 
national government, and benevolent associations of 
individuals;—that one great motive, presented to 
their minds by the government, has uniformly been 
the hope and expectation of a permanent residence, 
as farmers and mechanics, upon the lands of their 
ancestors, and their enjoyment of wise laws, 
administered by themselves, upon truly republican 
principles . . . and aided in the cultivation of their 
minds and hearts by benevolent individuals 
stationed among them at their own request, and 
partly at the charge of the general government, they 
have greatly risen in their character, condition, and 
prospects;—that they have a regularly organized 
government of their own, consisting of legislative, 
judicial, and executive departments, formed by the 
advice of the third President of the United States, 
and now in easy and natural operation . . . that a 
considerable number of the young, and some of the 
older, can read and write the English language . . . 
and, to crown the whole, that they are bound to us 
                                                          
43 Christian Watchman, March 9, 1822, cited in William G. McLoughlin, 
Cherokees and Missionaries, 1789-1839 (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1984), 155. 
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by the ties of Christianity which they profess, and 
which many of them exemplify as members of 
regular Christian churches.44 
 
Evarts, in his defense of the Cherokees remaining in their ancestral 
homeland, pointed out the progress they had made towards 
adopting white civilization. He displayed no signs of the extinction 
expectation so common to prevailing contemporary American 
racial thought. 
 Roberts and Evarts may have avoided the overt racism 
inherent in the arguments of Jackson and Cass, but they still fell 
prey to the ethnocentrism so vital to the construction of the 
Indigenous image.45 Evarts never attempts to depict Cherokee 
culture as civilized, never considered it as a stand-alone equal to 
white civilization. Instead, Evarts argues that the assistance of 
“benevolent individuals” – whites – and their government pulled 
the Cherokees out of the darkness of their savagery and into the 
light of white, Christian civilization. Roberts, similarly, does not 
remark upon the abilities of the Cherokee children as impressive in 
and of themselves, but instead asserts their mental prowess in 
relation to white children. 
 Although relatively sympathetic, missionaries construed the 
Indigenous image through the lens of an all-encompassing 
ethnocentrism, the same lens which framed and sustained the 
                                                          
44 Evarts, “No. XXII,” The “William Penn” Essays, 175-177. 
45 This is not to say that missionary perceptions did not contain racial overtones. 
Missionaries’ ethnocentrism relied heavily upon the subtleties of racism. Many 
missionaries, especially the Congregationalists, utilized the pseudoscience of 
their day to classify Cherokees as “full-blood,” “half-blood,” or “mixed-blood,” 
and some tended to target the Cherokees with some form of white ancestry, 
exasperating the stratifications that had taken root in Cherokee society since the 
acculturation process. For more on this, see McLoughlin, The Cherokees and 
Christianity, 65-67. 
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racism which pervaded their white contemporaries. The 
prioritization of Euro-American agricultural pursuits, Christian 
knowledge, and republican governance display more than solely a 
desire to spread the American way of life. These efforts, combined 
with depictions of the Cherokees prior to missionary and 
government intervention, demonstrate a potent ethnocentrism 
which bounded the missionaries’ objective ability to perceive their 
Native neighbors. Barbara Perry explores this process in her work 
Silent Victims. The inability to recognize value in the Cherokees as 
the Cherokees, and instead of placing worth on Cherokees in 
relation to whiteness, constructs an ethnocentric dynamic that 
operates on multiple levels. Missionaries’ inability to recognize 
Native religion as religion, Native agriculture as agriculture, and 
Native government as government represents a broader trend in 
which whites denigrated Native knowledge systems, and, by 
extension, Native life. This inability to accept Native knowledge 
systems as knowledge systems and Native life as a legitimate way 
of life both manifested from white ethnocentrism and conversely 
authenticated it. Usage of terms like “ignorant” and “darkness” and 
then the eventual knowledge acquirement, or “enlightenment,” that 
invariably came through a guiding white presence exposes the 
valuation of understanding only in relation to white understanding. 
Similarly, usage of terms like “savage” and “heathen” work in the 
same manner, evaluating and valuing civilization only in relation 
to white civilization, life only in relation to white life. This process 
functioned within the larger undercurrent of what Perry 
categorized as the racial/cultural genocide of Indigenous 
Americans.46 
                                                          
46 Barbara Perry, Silent Victims: Hate Crimes Against Native Americans 
(Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona Press, 2008): 42-43. She goes on to lay 
out how this process served to promote Euro-American interests: “It comes as 
no surprise, then, that through the process of colonization, indigenous 
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Conclusion 
 
Throughout the early nineteenth century, missionaries 
worked on behalf of the Cherokees and did their best to give voice 
to their cause. Many missionaries, such as Jeremiah Evarts, 
passionately championed the Cherokees and continually defended 
their rights to their land. Samuel Worcester and others went to jail 
instead of recognizing the rights of Georgia over Cherokee land, 
and helped build a public outcry against the injustice of the 
Georgian landgrab and legal assertion over the Cherokee people. 
Some missionaries, such as the Methodist Reverend James Jenkins 
Trott, married Cherokee women and started families with them, 
becoming a part of the tribe per Cherokee beliefs. Once anti-
Removal efforts collapsed and forced emigration became a reality, 
some missionaries, like Evan Jones, trekked the horrors of the Trail 
of Tears alongside the Cherokees.47 
 And yet, despite these relationships, and despite their 
comparative racial progressivism, missionaries almost universally 
viewed the Cherokees and other Indigenous Americans through the 
same ethnocentrism that partially lent justification to Cherokee 
removal and propagated the popular view of the warring and 
degenerate savage. The framework of this ethnocentrism 
constricted the friendships between the missionaries and the 
Cherokees and their defense of the tribe. The missionaries believed 
in Cherokee rights, but their Euro-American cultural centricity 
                                                                                                                                  
knowledge and perspectives have been ignored and denigrated by colonial 
powers seeking to exploit indigenous resources.” For more on how Euro-
American/colonial beliefs had a self-validating function, see Pearce, “Character 
and Circumstance: The Idea of Savagism,” Savagism and Civilization, 76-104. 
47 William G. McLoughlin, “Cherokees and Methodists, 1824-1834,” Church 
History, Vol. 50, Issue 1 (March 1, 1981): 44; Letters of Evan Jones, The 
Cherokee Removal, 158-162. 
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made them only able to assert these rights within the confines of 
white values: private property ownership, cultivation and/or 
exploitation of land, republican governance, and, most of all, 
Christianity. The missionaries supported the Cherokees, not in 
their right to live as Cherokees, but in their right to live as 
acculturated Americans.48 
Recognition of the ethnocentrism present within 
missionaries – who perhaps held the gentlest view of Indigenous 
Americans – constructs a more complex comprehension of 
American-Indian affairs in the early nineteenth century. Instead of 
demonstrating a coalition of missionaries and Cherokees versus 
Georgia and Jackson, such ethnocentricity breaks down this 
binary-like dynamic and layers our understanding of the associated 
relations, language, policies, and events of the time. One begins to 
see that the Cherokee way of life faced an assault on all fronts: 
Georgians and Jackson threatened their homeland while the 
missionaries, their supposedly benevolent friends, assaulted their 
culture and traditions. This enhanced complexity subsequently 
lends itself to a more complex, nuanced understanding of 
American-Indian relations overall, both past and present. 
                                                          
48 Beyond the ethical dilemmas surrounding forced assimilation, a slew of 
practical issues arises as well. The scope of this analysis disallows a more 
refined explanation of these practical issues, but a quick explanation suffices for 
a cursory understanding. Cultural assimilation requires, and its advocates often 
seem to assume, a monolithic and static nature to culture. This has no grounding 
in truth. A national, societal, communal, and even familial culture means 
something different to each individual within those groups. This expansive 
difference effectively bars any form of assimilation, as acculturation to so many 
separate, and sometimes competing, cultures is, of course, impossible. In effect, 
Native Americans were damned if they did not attempt acculturation – likely 
continually viewed as “savages” in their traditional ways – and damned if they 
did attempt acculturation – forfeiting the ways of life so vital to their self-
identities in pursuit of an impossible goal, which would leave them still depicted 
as “savages.” 
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 Similarly, these conclusions and the general approach can 
serve to foster a greater understanding of early Americans and, 
thus, early America. The significance of prevalent ethnocentrism 
within missionary depictions and interactions with the Cherokees 
raise the question of how ethnocentricity coated other 
contemporaneous affairs. How did Americans view immigration 
and assimilation, especially from non-Protestant, non-Anglo-
Saxons, who they likely perceived as drastically different from 
themselves? How did ethnocentricity inflect Manifest Destiny, in 
both land acquisition from Indigenous tribes and from Mexico? In 
what way does the assertion that “inferior” cultures/races face 
extinction while in contact with “superior” cultures/races affect an 
understanding of the support and effort to colonize freed blacks? 
These questions fall well beyond the scope of this analysis, but 
they all have intricate ties to the approach and conclusions of this 
piece. Ethnocentrism saturated early American thought, and an 
understanding of this creates a greater, more complex 
understanding of American history, whether dealing with Cherokee 
missionaries or something else entirely. When writing about the 
Cherokees, nineteenth century missionaries provided us with a tool 
to examine contemporary racial/cultural attitudes that illuminate 
both topics directly and indirectly dealt with by the missionaries 
and other topics they had no knowledge of. 
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A Divided Front: Military Dissent during 
the Vietnam War  
By 
Kaylyn Sawyer 
~ ♦ ~ 
Emerging from a triumphant victory in World War II. 
American patriotism surged in the 1950s.  Positive images in 
theater and literature of America’s potential to bring peace and 
prosperity to a grateful Asia fueled the notion that the United 
States could be the “good Samaritan of the entire world.”1 This 
idea prevailed through the mid-1960s as three-quarters of 
Americans indicated they trusted their government.  That positive 
feeling would not last, and America’s belief in its own 
exceptionalism would begin to shatter with “the major military 
escalation in Vietnam and the shocking revelations it brought.”2 
The turmoil in social and economic spheres during the 1960s 
combined with contradictions about America’s role in Vietnam and 
realization of the government’s deception regarding the nature and 
progress of the war itself fueled the largest movement of 
servicemen and veteran dissent in this nation’s history.  
The year 1965 would be pivotal in turning public opinion 
against the war as three significant events coincided to raise public 
consciousness.  First, Ramparts magazine, founded in 1962 as a 
liberal Catholic quarterly, published its first article on the war in 
Vietnam in January of 1965 highlighting the contradictions 
                                                          
1 Christian G. Appy, American Reckoning (New York: The Penguin Group, 
2015) 13.  
2 Appy, American Reckoning, xv.  
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between what America had been told about Vietnam and what was 
actually occurring there politically.3 Second, President Johnson 
announced in July, that he would increase the number of troops 
sent to Vietnam by 50,000.  This would necessitate a doubling of 
draft calls, seemingly in contradiction to the administration’s stated 
goal of peace.4 Finally, America was exposed to its first shocking 
images of the war’s reality through television. CBS correspondent 
Morley Safer, while accompanying US Marines on a search and 
destroy mission, produced what is considered to be one of the most 
controversial reports of the war. With images of US soldiers 
torching civilian houses as a backdrop, Safer simply stated, “This 
is what the war in Vietnam is all about.”5 For the first time, 
Americans saw that their troops were capable of committing 
atrocities. These events galvanized civilian activists and sparked 
the beginning of a dissent movement within the armed services.     
GI resistance to the Vietnam War began in 1965 similar to 
a ripple; it started with “individual acts of conscience,” but then 
spread into collective acts of organized dissent within the ranks.6  
The earliest known example of GI protest occurred on November 
6, 1965 in El Paso, Texas. Lieutenant Henry Howe joined a small 
civilian peace demonstration, carrying a sign that stated, “End 
Johnson’s Facist [sic] Aggression.”7 Although Howe was not in 
uniform, not on duty, and in apparent compliance with military 
                                                          
3 Robert Scheer, “Hang Down Your Head, Tom Dooley,” Ramparts, January 
1965.   
4 Pomfret, John D. “Johnson Orders 50,000 More Men to Vietnam and Doubles 
Draft; Again Urges U.N. to Seek Peace.” New York Times. July 29, 1965. 
5 Morley Safer’s Cam Ne News Broadcast. Accessed February 29, 2016. See  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hNYZZi25Ttg. 
6 Richard Moser, The New Winter Soldiers (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1996) 69.  
7 David Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: GI Resistance During the Vietnam War 
(Chicago:  
Haymarket Books, 1975) 52.  
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regulations, he was court-martialed and sentenced to two years 
hard labor. In February of 1966, former Green Beret Donald 
Duncan became the first Vietnam Veteran to publicly speak out 
against the war. In his Ramparts magazine article entitled, “The 
whole thing was a lie!” Duncan praised antiwar protestors, arguing 
they were “opposed to people, our own and others, dying for a lie, 
thereby corrupting the very word democracy.”8 In October 1966, 
Army doctor Howard Levy refused to train Green Beret medics 
headed to Vietnam. His court-martial defense was based on the 
Nuremberg principle requiring non-participation in war crimes or 
genocide. Despite a protracted and publicized trial process, Levy 
was convicted and sentenced to three years at Fort Leavenworth.9   
Before the summer of 1966, soldiers operated as 
individuals in their dissent to the war. However, on June 30, 1966, 
PFC James Johnson, PVT Dennis Mora, and PVT David Samas—
later known as the Fort Hood Three—became the first soldiers to 
collectively oppose the war. They refused direct orders to board a 
ship bound for Vietnam and stated in a press conference, “We have 
decided to take a stand against this war, which we consider 
immoral, illegal, and unjust.”10 In an article published in The 
Peacemaker periodical, Private Samas is quoted as saying during 
his court-martial, “The Nuremberg trials established that soldiers 
have the obligation to use their consciences in following orders.”11  
The GI resistance movement further grew to include issues 
of racial identity. Marines William Harvey and George Daniels—
both African American—were the first Marines to openly question 
                                                          
8 Donald Duncan, “The Whole Thing Was a Lie!,” Ramparts 4, no 10, February 
1966.    
9 Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: GI Resistance During the Vietnam War, 52.    
10 Moser, The New Winter Soldiers, 69.   
11 “Long Sentences for Three GI Refusers,” Peacemaker, September 17, 1966, 
Gettysburg College Special Collections, Box 14 Folder 1, 5.  
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whether African Americans should fight at all in Vietnam. The two 
men were arrested for asking to speak with their commanding 
officer, charged with “insubordination and promoting disloyalty,” 
and sentenced to prison.12 African Americans again rose up as a 
group on the night of August 23, 1968 in response to an executive 
decision to send troops to the Democratic Convention in Chicago. 
Over one hundred African American troops gathered at Fort Hood 
to “discuss their opposition to Army racism and the use of troops 
against civilians.”13 The forty-three African American GIs arrested 
became known as the Fort Hood Forty-Three.   
While civilian peace activists had organizations to promote 
their cause, it was not until April of 1967 that Vietnam veterans 
had an organization of their own. In the streets of Manhattan, over 
100,000 protestors gathered for what would be the largest rally in 
New York since the war began. Vietnam veterans were asked to 
march at the front, and the six who did so conceived Vietnam 
Veterans Against the War (VVAW). One of the six veterans, Jan 
Barry recalled how the organization came to be during the march:  
 
Just as we got close…somebody said, “Vietnam 
veterans go to the front”…Somebody had provided a 
banner that said Vietnam Veterans Against the 
War…So I tracked down this Veterans for Peace 
group, went to one of their meetings, and discovered 
there was no Vietnam veterans group, they just 
brought along the sign, hoping some Vietnam 
veterans would show up.14         
  
                                                          
12 Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: GI Resistance During the Vietnam War, 52.     
13 Ibid., 56.    
14 Moser, The New Winter Soldiers, 104.     
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Early statements of the VVAW claimed Vietnam was a civil war 
with no American solution, and that the American people were lied 
to about the nature of their country’s involvement.15 GI resistance 
was now represented by an official organization comprised of men 
who had fought in the conflict and witnessed first-hand the realities 
of the war.  
The GI movement continued to grow and gain momentum 
in 1968 as the war effort in Vietnam suffered. In April, forty GIs 
led an antiwar demonstration in San Francisco, marking the first 
time active-duty soldiers were at the head of a protest march.16 
Outside Fort Hood in Texas, soldiers gathered for a “love-in” to 
listen to rock music and antiwar speeches. Again in San Francisco, 
nine enlisted men went AWOL and took sanctuary in a church “in 
moral opposition to the war.”17 Later that year, twenty-seven 
inmates from the Presidio stockade in San Francisco held a “sit-
down strike” to protest the shooting of a fellow prisoner. The goal 
of this “Presidio Munity” was to call attention to the unbearable 
living conditions in the stockade.18 The GI movement was now 
widespread and organized.  Americans, both outside and within the 
military ranks, became increasingly disillusioned with their 
country’s war effort in Vietnam.  
  Dissent and disobedience took many forms.  Single 
protests, collective demonstrations, and organized actions were not 
the only ways for soldiers to dissent.  Other effective ways of 
undermining support for the war within the ranks were through the 
publication of underground GI newspapers and through the 
founding of coffeehouses near large military bases. GI newspapers 
were a fundamental expression of political opposition within the 
                                                          
15 Ibid.  
16 Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: GI Resistance During the Vietnam War, 57  
17 Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: GI Resistance During the Vietnam War, 57.   
18 Sir No Sir!, DVD, Directed by David Zeiger (Displaced Films, 2005).    
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military. By 1971, there were an estimated “144 underground 
newspapers published or aimed at U.S. military bases” written by 
active duty GIs, veterans, and civilian supporters.19 These 
underground newspapers were successful in reaching thousands of 
service members, with some of the largest papers, such as Vietnam 
GI, Camp News and The Bond claiming to reach tens of 
thousands.20 The GI Press Service was formed in June of 1969 as 
an “associated press” of GI underground newspapers, functioning 
as a national center for the distribution of articles.21 The primary 
function of most underground newspapers was to spread news of 
the GI movement, acts of resistance, the military responses, and 
general war news. Many of these papers were short-lived, but the 
impact of their message was not.     
  August 1969 was a milestone in military underground 
newspaper publishing when the antiwar paper Rough Draft gained 
permission to be openly distributed at Fort Eustis in Williamsburg, 
Virginia. Approval came from Major General Howard Schiltz after 
a four-month-long effort by Rough Draft representatives.22 In an 
issue of the local newspaper, an army spokesman emphasized, 
“This action cannot be construed in any way as an official 
endorsement of the contents of the newspaper.”23 On August 28, 
1969, the Rough Draft was openly distributed on post.  Future 
permission for distribution would be granted on an “issue-by-
                                                          
19 “The Collapse of the Armed Forces,” in Vietnam and America: A Documented 
History, Marvin E. Gettleman, Jane Franklin, Marilyn Young, H. Bruce Franklin 
(New York: Grove Press, 1985), 326.    
20 Moser, The New Winter Soldiers, 96.    
21 “GI Movement: Timeline, 1965-1973,” Antiwar and Radical History 
Project—Pacific  Northwest, University of Washington, 2009, Accessed 
February 28, 2016, http://depts.washington.edu/antiwar/gi_timeline.shtml.    
22 Dale M. Brumfield, Independent Press in D.C. and Virginia: An Underground 
History, Charleston: The History Press, 2015, 183.    
23 “’Rough Draft’ Distribution at Ft. Eustis Pleases Editors, Astonishes Some 
GIs,” Rough Draft, September/October 1969, Accessed February 29, 2016, 1.   
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issue” basis.24The Rough Draft was fulfilling part of its stated 
mission “to be a forum and a rally point for dissent” and “to 
destroy the negative influence of apathy among the servicemen of 
the armed forces and encourage them to stand for their rights.”25 
As a result of the victory at Fort Eustis, more antiwar papers were 
allowed distribution on bases across the United States. The 
underground newspaper no longer had to be underground.  
    In the absence of official approval for distribution on post, 
newspapers found their way out to the soldiers through a series of 
off-base coffeehouses, which served as a relaxed setting for GIs to 
interact with each other and to read antiwar material. The 
dissenting GIs who supported underground newspapers and 
coffeehouses were not officers, but enlisted soldiers.  Army veteran 
Fred Gardner wanted the mainstream peace movement to see GIs 
as potential antiwar allies instead of enemies. In January of 1968, 
Gardner opened the first coffeehouse in Columbia, South Carolina 
outside of Fort Jackson, and named it the UFO. Within a few 
months of its opening, “an average of six hundred GIs a week were 
visiting the place and antiwar activities were beginning to 
develop.”26 Gardner went on to open two more coffeehouses: the 
“Oleo Strut” near Fort Hood, Texas and “Mad Anthony Wayne’s” 
near Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The coffeehouses were 
strategically located outside major military training bases to attract 
unhappy GIs and give them an environment to voice their 
complaints. Often staffed by civilians, coffeehouses fostered a 
bond between soldiers and civilians, and served as a place where 
they could come together and work collaboratively.27 By 1971, 
                                                          
24 “Ex-Servicemen, Wives Distribute Antiwar Papers,” The Bee (Danville, VA), 
August 29, 1969, 4.   
25 “The Mission,” Rough Draft, September/October 1969, 1.  
26 Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: GI Resistance During the Vietnam War, 53.   
27 Moser, The New Winter Soldiers, 99.   
~ 146 ~ 
 
there were as many as twenty-six established coffeehouses.28  The 
network of coffeehouses and the proliferation of underground 
newspapers reflected the growing frustration and disillusionment 
over the stalemate that war in Vietnam was becoming.  
Racial and economic inequalities in the country during the 
1960s provided motivation for dissent within the ranks as military 
service did not eliminate the injustices of society at large.  The 
draft itself was biased against the poor and those without powerful 
connections. The draft was appropriately compared to a regressive 
tax, “falling on individuals whose income is low.”29 Most often, 
the drafted soldier belonged to the working class. The wealthy 
could choose alternate avenues for service, afford full-time college 
draft deferments, and obtain medical exemptions from private 
physicians. Vietnam veteran Ronald Spector writes, “The 
consideration that most determined a man’s chances of fighting 
and dying in Vietnam was not race but class. It was the poor who 
bore the lion’s share of the fighting and dying.”30 The American 
Serviceman’s Union (ASU), organized in trade union style to 
lobby for more equitable conditions within the military, established 
“a clear tradition of working-class resistance to military authority 
and unjust war.”31  
Economic exploitation was only one issue raised within the 
ranks as evidence of injustice.  Racial prejudice and inequality 
would prove to be a powerful source of dissidence and 
disobedience, reaching crisis levels in 1968 and the following 
years. The antiwar movement brought increased attention to racial 
                                                          
28 Ibid.   
29 The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 
Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, February 1970.   
30 Ronald H. Spector, After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (New York, The 
Free Press: 1994) 38.  
31 Moser, The New Winter Soldiers, 71-72.   
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issues within civilian society as well as within the ranks. African 
American soldiers’ antiwar sentiments were encouraged by leaders 
such as Mohammed Ali, Malcolm X, and Martin Luther King Jr., 
who all spoke out against the war.32 One of the main issues raised 
was whether African American soldiers should risk their lives for a 
country that denies them basic rights at home. Civil rights leader 
Julian Bond echoes this feeling in his graphic novel as he writes, 
“Why are we always first citizens on the battlefield and second 
class citizens at home.”33 These were valid questions, as discussion 
of the condition of American society and of the armed forces in the 
mid-sixties will show.    
Vietnam was the first war in American history in which the 
military was fully integrated, and thus African American men 
could see the potential for greater career opportunities and mobility 
in the armed forces than in the civilian sector.   In one study of 
volunteer enlistments, African American soldiers often cited “self-
advancement” as the reason for enlisting while white soldiers cited 
draft avoidance.34 Once in the military, however, black soldiers 
experienced the continuing consequences of racial discrimination 
and institutionalized segregation and found “that educational 
deficiencies barred them from qualifying for many of the highly 
skilled or highly technical jobs.”35 They felt discriminated against 
in promotions, and they felt they were disproportionately 
represented in combat units. These factors combined to spur 
African American troops to be among the first antiwar advocates 
                                                          
32 David Cortright, “Black GI Resistance During the Vietnam War,” Vietnam 
Generation: Vol. 2, Article 5, 1990, 2.  
33 “Vietnam: An Antiwar Comic Book,” University of Virginia, 4, Accessed 
March 5, 2016.  
34 Charles C. Moskos Jr., “The American Dilemma In Uniform: Race in the 
Armed Forces,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, March 1973, 102.      
35 Spector, After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam, 37.    
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inside the military.36 Because many black men could not afford 
deferment status, African Americans were over-proportionately 
drafted. The disproportionate assignment of blacks to combat arms 
in a supposedly equal and desegregated military reflects the 
continued impact of inequality in education.37 Between 1961 and 
1966, blacks accounted for 16% of soldiers killed in Vietnam, a 
number out of proportion to their participation.38 By 1967, the 
military took action to reduce the number of black casualties by 
reducing their numbers in front-line combat units.39 By 1972, black 
representation in the military (11%) and in casualty lists (12%) was 
in proportion to their presence in the total population (11-12%).40 
While racial unrest was making headlines in the United States, 
racial tension did not reach crisis levels among soldiers in Vietnam 
until the 1968 assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.   After 
that, “signs of racial polarization and tension became clear and 
unmistakable.”41     
African Americans were not the only minority group to be 
affected by heightened racial consciousness and subjected to the 
racial injustices of the Vietnam War. Latino and American Indian 
communities had similar frustrations and offered a strong antiwar 
presence as they found ways to collaborate with the black 
community to voice their dissent. GIs United Against the War was 
a dissent organization founded by African American Joe Miles that 
                                                          
36 Appy, American Reckoning, 140.    
37 Moskos Jr., “The American Dilemma In Uniform: Race in the Armed Forces,” 
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38 Ibid., 101.   
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included black, Latino, and some white soldiers.  Private Mora of 
the Fort Hood Three was Latino, and at his trial stated, “We lived 
in a tenement because we were Puerto Ricans” and implied that he 
was limited in career opportunities because of his race.42  While an 
integrated Armed Force might have been able to soften the social 
and educational deprivations suffered by minorities, it could not 
eliminate them.  In the heat of a highly- contested war, these 
differences became magnified as race-based dissent within the 
military was clearly linked to greater civil rights struggles for 
minority and oppressed groups.43  
Meanwhile, the war effort in Vietnam was floundering.  In 
January 1968, the Tet Offensive revealed how desperate the 
situation in Vietnam really was.  On January 30, forces from North 
Vietnam “struck seven major South Vietnamese cities, burning 
government buildings, freeing prisoners, and lobbing rockets and 
mortars onto military installations.”44 This massive attack 
repudiated any idea that a victory for the United States was within 
sight. Tet exposed the government’s propaganda about the success 
of the war, destroyed the sense of optimism about the war’s 
progress, exposed the lies about the support of the South 
Vietnamese for the American presence, served as a catalyst for 
increased veteran resistance, and, in the words of Walter Cronkite, 
demonstrated that “it seems now more certain than ever that the 
bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate.”45 While 
deemed a military success, the Tet Offensive convinced many 
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Americans of the war’s futility and is considered to be a significant 
turning point in the war, one that decimated troop morale and 
galvanized veteran resistance.46  
Following revelations from the Tet Offensive, two 
additional events served as key catalysts for increasing antiwar 
activism among veterans.   From December 1968 to May 1969, the 
United States undertook a major offensive to gain control of a large 
and heavily populated region of the Mekong Delta.47 The success 
of Operation Speedy Express was measured, as all ground and air 
missions were, by body count of those killed.  This created a 
“single-minded focus on killing” which filtered down from a 
command level through the ranks.  The body count as a 
measurement system was later denounced by one general as “A 
great crime and cancer in the Army in the eyes of young 
officers.”48 By official standards, Operation Speedy Express was a 
success because of the high body count. Later investigation would 
reveal that many of those killed were noncombatant civilians, 
exposing the indiscriminate brutality of this war.  The second 
incident occurred in 1969 in the village of My Lai when American 
soldiers murdered hundreds of unarmed civilians. Once the story 
was exposed in 1971, Americans were appalled that their “boys” 
were capable of such violence. Antiwar veterans were further 
frustrated by the lack of accountability at a command level and the 
prosecution of low-level officers such as Lieutenant William 
Calley, who was perceived as a scapegoat. This incidence of 
brutality at My Lai led the Vietnam Veterans Against the War to 
conduct the Winter Soldier Investigation, a hearing on war crimes, 
in 1971. Their goal was to prove that “the use of terror and mass 
destruction tactics against Vietnam’s civilian population was a 
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pervasive phenomenon directly resulting from U.S. war policy.”49 
Operation Speedy Express and the My Lai Massacre exposed the 
brutality of tactics, the failure of leadership, and the utter 
immorality of the body count strategy that could no longer be 
overlooked.   
  Men serving in the Armed Forces, by this time, had seen 
enough hypocrisy, deception, and immorality in their leadership to 
justify dissent and outright disobedience.   Over in Vietnam, 
soldiers saw clear evidence that the United States was neither 
supporting democracy nor the will of the South Vietnamese 
people.  One Marine wounded in Vietnam recalled, “I think any 
other war would’ve been worth my foot. But not this one. One day, 
someone has got to explain to me why I was there.”50American 
soldiers were demoralized by the war’s brutal tactics and senseless 
casualties.51 Army veteran James D. Henry explained why he 
became an outspoken critic of the war in Vietnam: “My sole 
motivation was and is to stop the atrocities and to stop the taking 
of otherwise average young Americans and transforming them into 
people capable and willing to perform atrocities.”52 Embittered by 
immoral rules of engagement, veterans returned home from the 
war, “dehumanized by the senseless and indiscriminate 
destructiveness of American policy.”53 Additionally, tension 
between drafted soldiers and career men created an environment of 
distrust.  Draftees made up half of the US Army by the summer of 
1968, and as people who did not choose service; they found the 
                                                          
49 Moser, The New Winter Soldiers, 111.  
50 Murray Polner, “Vietnam War Stories,” Special Collections at Gettysburg 
College, Radical Pamphlets Collection Box 16, Folder 1, 9.    
51 Appy, American Reckoning, 211.   
52 James D. Henry (as told by Donald Duncan), “The Men of ‘B’ Company,” 
Gettysburg College Special Collections, Radical Pamphlets Collection, Box 17 
Folder 1, 31.   
53 Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: GI Resistance During the Vietnam War, 27.  
~ 152 ~ 
 
strict regimen of military discipline to be overwhelming.54 Career 
officers resented the dissenting draftees.  As the war dragged on, 
resistance exploded, eventually reaching Vietnam itself.  
The antiwar movement in the United States focused on 
politics and thus differed from the antiwar movement that occurred 
later in Vietnam, which focused on practical aspects of survival.  
Instead of marching in protests or reading literature in 
coffeehouses, soldiers in Vietnam protested the war by refusing 
orders, avoiding the enemy, or by violently attacking the officer in 
command. One of the most effective forms of GI resistance was 
combat refusal, when soldiers refused, disobeyed, or negotiated an 
order.55 The first incident of combat refusal to appear in the news 
occurred in August 1969. Alpha Company, 3rd Battalion, 196th 
Light Infantry refused a direct order to attack, and the story 
appeared in the New York Times.56 Instances such as this brought 
about a democratic form of military decision making with soldiers 
having power over command. As a result, many commanders 
found they would have to negotiate with their units over what they 
were willing to do under certain circumstances. However, if 
negotiations failed, antiwar soldiers would resort to fragging—a 
term used to describe violence directed at superiors.57 It was 
organized and deliberate, with many of these attacks occurring on 
base instead of during the fury of battle. By the time the last 
American troops were leaving Vietnam in July 1972, the total 
number of fragging incidents has escalated to 551 with eighty-six 
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soldiers dead and over seven hundred wounded.58Mutinous or 
rebellious soldiers were imprisoned, and as a result, “prisons 
became schools of resistance and sites of rebellion.”59 The most 
notorious prison riot occurred in 1968 at the Long Binh Jail, with 
soldiers rising up to protest the poor living conditions they were 
subject to.  The unrest lasted for over one month, and is considered 
to be the largest and most explosive episode of soldier resistance in 
Vietnam.60  
Other GIs who opposed the war expressed dissent in a less 
violent and direct way. The most pervasive kind of antiwar activity 
in the military was known as “combat avoidance,” where “search-
and-destroy missions were turned into search-and-avoid 
missions.”61 Instead of going out and fighting the enemy, soldiers 
would go out and do their best to avoid any contact with the 
enemy. One soldier recalled, “The military teaches you mission 
first, man second. But because I felt the mission was stupid…the 
men were much more important to me than the mission.”62 This 
was part of a larger nonviolent resistance movement that included 
shamming: “the use of deception, stealth, ruse, and petty 
sabotage.”63  
Soldiers also turned to drug use as a form of passive 
resistance. Smoking marijuana was symbolically tied to the 
antiwar movement back home, so soldiers were using drugs to 
connect themselves to an antiwar stance.64 By 1967, more 
servicemen in Vietnam were arrested for marijuana charges than 
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for any other major offense.65 Colonel Robert Heinl reported that a 
Congressional investigating subcommittee found that drug 
addiction in the Armed Forces was “of epidemic proportions.”66 
When mental escape through drug use would not suffice, GIs 
would simply walk away from the war they no longer believed in. 
In 1967, American soldier William Percell applied for political 
asylum in Sweden. He stated, “The United States war in Vietnam 
is not my war. I have no wish to be an American any longer.”67 He 
was not alone.  Between 1966 and 1971 army desertion rates 
increased nearly 400%.68 The Army desertion rate peaked in 1971 
and steadily decreased afterward as internal reforms were 
implemented and the burden of war shifted from ground assaults to 
air assaults.  Other branches of service then experienced internal 
disruption with Air Force desertion rates peaking in 1972 and 
Navy desertion rates peaking in 1973.69 These branches also 
experienced the same kind of dissent that had plagued the Army: 
combat refusals, mutiny, and sabotage.70   
As the war effort was winding down and ground forces 
were being withdrawn, dissent within the Army began to wane.  
With fewer ground troops needed, the number of draftees was 
likewise reduced and fewer men were pressed into service against 
their will. On January 27, 1973, a peace agreement was signed that 
officially ended America’s involvement in the war. On that same 
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day, the Secretary of Defense announced that the draft would 
end.71 The Army would move towards an all-volunteer force, one 
that would theoretically breed less dissent and disobedience. The 
Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed 
Force predicted, “Problems raised by the forced military service of 
those who are unwilling or unable to adjust to military life will be 
largely overcome by voluntary recruiting.”72 The Armed Forces 
would have stable ground upon which they would reconstruct 
themselves after being nearly destroyed from within. The divisive 
Vietnam War sparked radical dissent movements first from civilian 
activists and then from activists within the military itself.  What 
began as isolated incidences of protest grew into collective acts of 
dissent and disobedience within the ranks.   
By the early 1970s the Army was no longer an effective 
fighting force in Vietnam. Marine Colonel Robert Heinl wrote that 
“by every conceivable indicator, our army that now remains in 
Vietnam is in a state approaching collapse, with individual units 
avoiding or having refused combat, murdering their officers and 
noncommissioned officers, drug ridden, and dispirited where not 
near mutinous.”73 False and hypocritical war justifications, 
deception about progress, indiscriminate brutality against civilians, 
immorality in leadership decisions, and preexisting social 
inequalities all combined to threaten the cohesiveness of the 
service.  This gave rise to the largest movement of servicemen and 
veteran dissent in this nation’s history, one that would play a 
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significant role in the decision to end the war and one that would 
lead to lasting change in the armed services.    
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